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Tuesday, October 22, 2019

+Myth: The IPCC's 1990 Report Over-estimated Greenhouse-gas-induced Global Warming

The outline for this post is as follows:
  1. The Myth and Its Flaws
  2. Context and Analysis (divided into multiple sections)
  3. Posts Providing Further Information and Analysis
  4. References

This is the "+References" version of this post, which means that this post contains my full list of references and citations. If you would like an abbreviated and easier to read version, then please go to the "main version" of this post.

References are cited as follows: "[#]", with "#" corresponding to the reference number given in the References section at the end of this post.




1.  The Myth and Its Flaws



The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) over-estimated greenhouse-gas-induced warming when they used climate models to predict global warming in their 1990 First Assessment Report (FAR).

Promoters of the aforementioned myth include Christopher Monckton [1, from 1:08 - 4:40; 16; 17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 114; 506], Clive Best [14; 15], Ira Glickstein [32 - 35], Tim Ball [545], Euan Mearns [19], and Javier [6 - 11; 254; 255; 570], all of the contrarian blog WattsUpWithThat. Other myth advocates include David Whitehouse of WattsUpWithThat and the Global Warming Policy Foundation (GWPF) [587; 588, citing 590; 690, pages 3, 8, and 9], Nate Silver [549, pages 396 - 398 and figure 12-7], Judith Curry [253; 588, citing 590], Roger Pielke Jr. [20; 21; 578; 686, with 687 and 688], Ross McKitrick [546; 689], Patrick Michaels [584; 588, citing 590], Willie Soon [17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 26, page 5; 506], Stephen McIntyre [585; 588, citing 590], David Legates [17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 506], Joe Bastardi [594; 595], Aynsley Kellow [581, citing 582, page 81; 583, page 150], Matt Ridley [606; 611; 682; 683], David Evans [12; 13; 116; 624; 626] + Joanne Nova [550; 551; 626], Kenneth Richard of the contrarian blog NoTricksZone [511; 512], James Taylor [22; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18] and Jim Lakely [22] of the Heartland Institute, multiple individuals writing in The Wall Street Journal [23 - 25], The Telegraph [282; 283] (which engages in false balance on climate science [283]), an editorial from The Washington Times that cites Anthony Watts [553], Fox News citing Roy Spencer [586; 588, citing 590], Thomas Gale Moore [509], Rupert Darwall [547], David Friedman [36], Kesten Green [26, page 5; 506], J. Scott Armstrong [26, page 5; 506], William M. Briggs [17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 506], Nick Minchin [624; 625], Peter Stallinga [496], Warren Meyer [588, citing 590; 589], The Galileo Movement [612], and the contrarian blog C3 Headlines [27], among others [171; 507; 544; 548; 565; 613]. 

The claims of Evans [12; 70 - 73; 552; 655; 656], Nova [12; 70 - 73; 552; 655; 656], Curry [554; 555], Michaels [591 - 593], Best [74; 75], Armstrong [76 - 78], Ridley [607 - 610; 683; 684], and Ball [598] are particularly ironic, since they each made failed temperature trend forecasts, even as they spread a myth about the IPCC failing in its forecast. Javier [81; 82; 570; 597], Glickstein [79; 80], and Bastardi [596] also made temperature trend predictions that are well on their way to being falsified. Monckton, Soon, Legates, and Briggs advocate a model [17, figure 6; 18, figure 4] that under-estimates post-1990 warming by roughly a factor of 2, as per the observed warming trends in figure 4 in section 2.1 and the lower atmosphere analyses discussed in section 2.3 [256; 427; 428].

The myth's flaws: Post-1990 global warming matches the trend forecasted by the IPCC's FAR in 1990 [5; 28, pages xi, xviii - xxiii, 190, and 331 - 336], as per figure 4 in section 2.1, and FAR also forecasted post-1990 [28, page xi, figure 12 on page 30, figure 14 on page xxxi, figure 9.7 on page 277, and figure A.12 on page 337] warming-induced [28, page xi; 317; 371 - 375] sea level rise [126, page S84; 376 - 379] reasonably well [115, section 1.3.4.1 on page 136 and figure 1.10 on page 137; 604]. Myth proponents conceal this point by using a number of misleading tactics, including:
  • illegitimately cherry-picking [1, from 1:08 - 4:40; 6 - 16; 17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 19 - 25; 26, page 5; 27; 32 - 36; 114; 116; 171; 254; 282; 283; 496; 506; 507; 509; 511; 512; 544; 546 - 548; 550; 551; 606; 612; 624; 626; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18; 690, pages 3, 8, and 9] a projected warming trend from one of the IPCC's warming scenarios [28, figure 5 on page xix and figure A.3 on page 333], in a way that ignores the fact that that scenario's greenhouse gas levels were consistently higher than observed post-1990 greenhouse gas increases
  • ignoring [1, from 1:08 - 4:40; 6 - 16; 17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 19 - 25; 26, page 5; 27; 32 - 36; 114; 116; 171; 254; 282; 283; 496; 506; 507; 509; 511; 512; 544; 546 - 548; 549, pages 396 - 398 and figure 12-7; 550; 551; 606; 612; 624; 626; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18; 690, pages 3, 8, and 9] a projected warming trend from one of the IPCC scenarios that better represents [28, figure 5 on page xix and figure A.3 on page 333] observed greenhouse gas increases [65, pages 2078, 2083, and 2085, figures S2, S3, and S15; 115, pages 132 and 133; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.1 on page 167; 364 - 369] and better represents [28, figure 6 on page xx, figure 2.4 on page 56, and figure A.6 on page 335] how much the greenhouse gas increases impacted Earth's energy balance [65, figures 9, 11, 12, S2, S3, and S15; 108, figure 3 on page 46; 117, figure 4; 272, figure 8.18 on page 699; 657, figure 1]
  • performing [6; 12; 14; 15; 17, figures 1 and 6; 18, figure 4; 21; 22; 27; 114; 116; 496; 506; 548; 550; 551; 624; 626] an apples-to-orange [388] comparison of the IPCC's surface trend forecast [5; 28, pages xi, xviii - xxiii, 190, and 331 - 336] vs. satellite-based analyses of thick layers of the lower atmosphere [126, pages S17 and S18; 385 - 387]; these flawed satellite-based analyses are known to under-estimate warming [126, page S17; 385, page 7715; 398; 400, figure 10], and one of these analyses comes from a research team with a decades-long history of under-estimating warming [305, from 36:31 to 37:10; 386; 387; 392; 399; 402; 403, pages 5 and 6; 404 - 409]
  • cherry-picking [8; 14; 15; 17, figure 6; 18, figure 4; 19; 23 - 25; 496; 544; 546 - 548; 550; 551; 626] a surface analysis known to under-estimate warming due to its poorer global coverage [83, page 57; 147; 148; 149, section 4; 150, figure 1, sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3; 151 - 162; 633, section 2b on page 4681], while willfully ignoring other analyses with better coverage

The myth therefore fails. This failure undermines attempts to use FAR to claim the IPCC is an alarmist organization that exaggerates climate change. Consistent with this, the IPCC tends to often under-estimate climate change trends [38, page 86; 39 - 53; 495, page 1-13 in section 1.4] (as the IPCC itself acknowledges [495, page 1-13 in section 1.4]) and use non-alarmist, conservative language that acknowledges when uncertainty is present [54 - 58; 465]. 

So the IPCC successfully predicted subsequent global warming by focusing on greenhouse gas increases, supporting the evidence-based [83, page 57; 99; 109; 144; 184, chapter 3; 185, pages 22 - 24; 186 - 242] scientific consensus [243, table 1; 244; 245, page 49; 246, figure 2 v007 on page 11; 247, page 28 in chapter 2; 248] that humans caused most of the recent global warming, primarily via increasing greenhouse gas levels. As the IPCC noted in their 2018 Special Report, human-made global warming continues at a rate consistent with climate models [83, pages 4 and 57 - 59]. Other academic [4; 5; 150; 172 - 174] and non-academic sources [3; 113; 175 - 182; 616; 617] similarly note that recent surface warming trends remain consistent with model-based predictions. During the same post-1990 period in which the IPCC accurately predicted global warming and sea level rise, ocean de-oxygenation continued, oceans became 13% more acidic due to human-made increases in greenhouse gases, ice melted across the globe, and a human-made mass extinction progressed, as discussed in section 2.1 of "Myth: Ocean Acidification Requires that an Ocean Becomes an Acid".


(The following Twitter thread covers some of the material discussed in this blogpost: https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1081256511404498944And for discussion of some of the IPCC's more recent temperature trend predictions, see section 2.1 of "Myth: The IPCC's 2007 ~0.2°C/decade Model-based Projection Failed and Judith Curry's Forecast was More Reliable".
A number of other individuals also debunked the myth this blogpost focuses on, including Peter Hadfield (a.k.a. potholer54) [1, from 1:08 to 2:56; 2, from 1:02:36 - 1:06:28], David J. Frame [5], Dáithí A. Stone [5], Richard Alley [37, from 3:04 to 4:35], Zeke Hausfather [3, as per 4; 283] of CarbonBrief [3], Dana Nuccitelli of SkepticalScience [113; 564, pages 82 - 84; 574], Nick Stokes [563], and Anton Dybal {a.k.a. A Skeptical Human} [513]. The contrarian Larry Kummer, a.k.a. Fabius Maximus, misrepresents the work of Frame and Stone in order to conceal the accuracy of the IPCC's temperature trend forecasts [277 - 281].)



2. Context and Analysis



Section 2.1: The IPCC 1990 Report Accurately Predicted Post-1990 Surface Warming


In 1990, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released their First Assessment Report (FAR) [28]. Over the next three decades, the IPCC released a number of other assessment reports, special reports, etc. [59 - 64; 83]. But FAR remains their earliest assessment report, and thus contains the IPCC's earliest temperature trend projections [28, pages xxii, xxiii, and 336].

In climate science, a projection states what will happen (often with a stated probability), given a set of initial conditions. A prediction states what will actually happen (often with a stated probability) [4; 84, page 943; 85; 86, pages 120 and 126]. For example, suppose someone named Ippy made the following two projections:
  1. If you cross the street at 7:00, then the red car will hit you.
  2. If you do not cross the street at 7:00, then the red car will not hit you.
One can treat these projections as "If [...], then [...]" conditionals, where the "If [....]" clause states the sufficient (or antecedent) condition for Ippy's projections, while the "then [...]" clause states the consequent that follows the projection's antecedent condition. 

Now suppose you do not cross the street at 7:00. One can plug this information into Ippy's projections, and come up with the prediction that "the red car will not hit you." Someone named Monk then claims that:

"The red car did not hit you. So Ippy was wrong when they predicted that the red car would hit you. Ippy was thus an alarmist who tried to needlessly frighten you."

Monk's claim fails since Ippy did not predict that you would be hit by the red car. Instead Ippy projected that you would be hit by the car, if you crossed the street at 7:00. Since the "you crossed the street at 7:00" antecedent condition was not met, then Ippy did not predict the consequent that you would be hit by the red car. Thus Monk erroneously treated Ippy's projection as being a prediction, despite the fact that the antecedent condition for the projection was not met.

One can extend these same points to the IPCC FAR's temperature trend projections. FAR treated the terms "projection" and "prediction" as being largely interchangeable [ex: 28, pages xi, xii, and xxii], though later IPCC reports clarified the distinction between a prediction and a projection [84, page 943; 85; 86, pages 120 and 126]. FAR offered conditional projections, where the antecedent conditions were, among other things, greenhouse gas increases in response to human emission of greenhouse gases, while the consequents were changes in global average surface temperature [5; 28, pages xi, xviii - xxiii, 190, and 331 - 336]. Figure 1 below presents one of these projected consequents for a Business-as-Usual scenario (BaU, or scenario A) in which humans release large amounts of greenhouse gases:

Figure 1: Climate-model-based simulation of greenhouse-gas-induced changes in relative global mean surface temperature under the Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario. The trend from 1850 to 1990 is based on observed greenhouse gas increases, while the trend from 1990 to 2100 follows the projected BaU scenario [28, figure 8 on page xxii]. The high estimate and low estimate represent the bounds of uncertainty around the best estimate [28, page xxii].

The graph depicts realised temperature rise, instead of projected committed temperature rise. Realised temperature rise represents the amount of warming that already occurred by a certain point in time. In contrast, committed warming represents how much future warming will occur, given the greenhouse gas increases up to that point [28, page xxii]. The low estimate uses an equilibrium climate sensitivity of 1.5°C, the best estimate uses 2.5°C, and the high estimate uses 4.5°C [28, pages xxii, xxv, 189, and 336], though Dana Nuccitelli of SkepticalScience argues that given changes in estimates of radiative forcing, the corresponding climate sensitivities are actually 1.2°C, 2.1°C, and 3.7°C, respectively [113; 564, pages 82 - 84]; I discuss radiative forcing and equilibrium climate sensitivity in section 2.2.

In addition to BaU, the IPCC offered projections for scenarios B, C, and D, in which humans control their greenhouse gas emissions and thus greenhouse gas levels increase less than in BaU [28, pages xix, xx, xxii, xxiii, 331, 333, 335, and 336; 566, page 14 and table 2.8 on pages 26 - 29, cited by 28 on pages 331 and 337]:


"Under the IPCC Business-as-Usual (Scenario A) emissions of greenhouse gases, the average rate of increase of global mean temperature during the next century is estimated to be about 0.3°C per decade (with an uncertainty range of 0.2°C to 0.5°C) [.] This will result in a likely increase in global mean temperature of about 1°C above the present value [...] by 2025 and 3°C above today's [...] before the end of the next century.
[...]
Under the other IPCC emission scenarios which assume progressively increasing levels of controls, average rates of increase in global mean temperature over the next century are estimated to be about 0.2°C per decade (Scenario B), just above 0.1°C per decade (Scenario C) and about 0.1°C per decade (Scenario D) [28, page xxii]."

BaU involves the greatest greenhouse gas increases, followed by scenario B, then scenario C, and finally scenario D [28, figure 6 on page xx and figure A.3 on page 333]. Figure 2 compares the projected temperature trend for BaU to temperature trends for scenarios B, C, and D:

Figure 2:  Climate-model-based simulation of greenhouse-gas-induced changes in relative global mean surface temperature under different scenarios. Only the best estimate for each scenario is shown here [28, figure A.9 on page 336], unlike the uncertainty range shown for BaU above in figure 1 [28, figure 8 on page xxii].

The best estimates use an equilibrium climate sensitivity of 2.5°C [28, figure A.9 on page 336], though Dana Nuccitelli of SkepticalScience argues that given changes in estimates of radiative forcing, the corresponding climate sensitivity is actually 2.1°C [113; 564, pages 82 - 84]; I discuss radiative forcing and equilibrium climate sensitivity in section 2.2.


This is where the myth comes in. Myth proponents argue that post-1990 data shows that the IPCC's 1990 FAR forecast over-estimated global warming. More precisely: myth defenders claim to compare a BaU warming trend of ~0.3°C/decade, to observational analyses that show significantly less than ~0.3°C/decade of post-1990 warming [1, from 1:08 - 4:40; 6 - 16; 17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 19 - 25; 26, page 5; 27; 32 - 36; 114; 116; 171; 254; 282; 283; 496; 506; 507; 509; 511; 512; 544; 546 - 548; 549, pages 396 - 398 and figure 12-7; 550; 551; 606; 612; 624; 626; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18; 690, pages 3, 8, and 9]. But in doing this, the myth advocates commit a distortion akin to Monk's above distortion of Ippy's projection: they treat the IPCC's BaU projection as being a prediction, despite the fact that the antecedent condition for this projection was not met (contrarians, including the myth proponent Ross McKitrick, use a similar tactic to misrepresent 1988 projections from the climate scientist James Hansen, as I discuss in section 2.4 of "Myth: Santer et al. Show that Climate Models are Very Flawed"; the non-contrarian Nate Silver distorts Hansen's projections as well [549, the two paragraphs following figure 12-6]). 

BaU's antecedent condition was not met because BaU's projected greenhouse gas increases outpaced observed increases for all the greenhouse gases projected in FAR, as per the figures in supplementary section 2.1. The net observed greenhouse gas increases, relative to the scenarios [28, figure 5 on page xix and figure A.3 on page 333], were:
  • CO2 [65, figure 9 on page 2078; 115, figure 1.5 on page 132; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.1 on page 167; 364; 671], N2O [65, figure 12 on page 2085; 115, figure 1.7 on page 133; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.3 on page 168; 366; 671]   :   roughly half-way between BaU and B
  • CH4   :   roughly scenario D [65, figure 11 on page 2083; 115, figure 1.6 on page 133; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.2 on page 167; 365; 671]
  • CFC-11 [65, figure S2; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.4 on page 168; 367; 671], CFC-12 [65, figure S3; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.4 on page 168; 368; 671], HCFC-22 [65, figure S15; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.4 on page 168; 369; 671]   :   less than scenario D

Various factors contributed to observed greenhouse gas increases being less than BaU. Agreements such as the Montreal Protocol limited human release of CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons), leading to both mitigation of global warming [99 - 102; 629, page 27.44; 657] and mitigation of stratospheric ozone depletion [87 - 96; 97, pages 599 and 600; 98, page S19]. This is unsurprising since scientists knew about the warming effect of CFCs even before the IPCC published FAR [658 - 664]. The IPCC explicitly noted that the BaU projection largely excluded mitigated CFC levels from the then recently agreed upon Montreal Protocol [566, pages xxiii - xxiv, cited by 28 on pages 331 and 337]. Circumstances, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union [103; 106, page 506; 470 - 472], also curbed CH4 (methane) emissions [67; 68, figure S.1 on page 5; 69], thereby mitigating warming, consistent with CH4's role as a greenhouse gas [99; 103 - 105; 106, sections 6.3.3.1 and 6.3.3.2; 107; 108]. The Soviet Union's collapse further limited atmospheric CO2 increases [68, figure S.1 on page 5; 665 - 668] by, for example, changing land use practices in a way that increased land uptake of CO2 [466 - 469].

Taken together, these and other factors result in BaU over-estimating all of the observed greenhouse gas increases, while B over-estimates some increases and under-estimates others, as per supplementary section 2.1. So overall, scenario B better represents the net observed greenhouse gas changes than does BaU. David J. Frame and Dáithí A. Stone make a similar same point as well with respect to BaU [5, figure 1] (in section 2.2, I also make this case in terms of "radiative forcing", instead of just in terms of greenhouse gas increases). Myth proponents therefore err when they cherry-pick BaU's projected warming trend, without adequately addressing the fact that BaU over-estimates observed greenhouse gas increases [1, from 1:08 - 4:40; 6 - 16; 17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 19 - 25; 26, page 5; 27; 32 - 36; 114; 116; 171; 254; 282; 283; 496; 506; 507; 509; 511; 512; 544; 546 - 548; 550; 551; 606; 612; 624; 626; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18; 690, pages 3, 8, and 9]. 

Better options include:
  • Option 1  :  comparing post-1990 warming to scenario B's trend
  • Option 2  :  comparing post-1990 warming to BaU, while noting that BaU over-estimates greenhouse gas increases
  • Option 3  :  comparing the ratio of observed post-1990 warming vs. observed post-1990 greenhouse-gas-induced energy impact, to the ratio of projected post-1990 warming vs. projected post-1990 greenhouse-gas-induced energy impact  

(Peter Hadfield {a.k.a. potholer54} chose option 1 [2, from 1:02:36 - 1:06:28], Zeke Hausfather completed 2 [3; 283] for CarbonBrief [3], Dana Nuccitelli of SkepticalScience used 3 [113; 564, pages 82 - 84; 574], while both Hausfather and Gavin Schmidt performed 3 [4, figures 2, S2, and S6]. Option 3, in more precise terms, involves compares the ratio of warming vs. radiative forcing increase, as per the climate sensitivity discussed in section 2.2. David J. Frame and Dáithí A. Stone used a modified version of 3, in which they ran a climate model akin to the IPCC's FAR model, except Frame and Stone used observed post-1990 greenhouse gas increases and radiative forcings increase, instead of the increases projected in BaU, scenario B, C, and D. This allowed Frame and Stone to plug in antecedent conditions to generate an IPCC FAR post-1990 prediction to compare to observed post-1990 warming [5].)

Any of these three options would confirm the accuracy of the IPCC's forecast, as per the parenthetical note above. So I will pursue all three. In section 2.2 I will use option 3, while in this section I will focus on option 1 and, to a lesser extent, option 2. Thus this blogpost section 2.1 focuses on the ~0.2°C/decade scenario B warming trend [28, page xxii, figure 9 on page xxiii, and figure A.9 on page 336] shown in figure 2 and mentioned in IPCC FAR [28, page xxii, figure 9 on page xxiii, and figure A.9 on page 336]. Also note that the ~0.3°C/decade BaU trend [28, page xxii, figure 9 on page xxiii, and figure A.9 on page 336] is not applicable due to BaU (scenario A) over-estimating all the greenhouse gas increases, as per supplementary section 2.1. Choosing scenarios C or D instead of scenario B would still leave one with almost the same 1990 - 2019 warming projection of ~0.2°C/decade [28, page xxii, figure 9 on page xxiii, and figure A.9 on page 336], as per figure 2. Despite this, I will still focus on scenario B, since if the myth fails with B's slightly larger warming trend, then the myth will also fail with C and D's slightly lower trends.

The 1990 First Assessment Report's projected warming trend for scenario B is consistent with the IPCC's continued use of a projected trend of around 0.2°C/decade in their 2001 Third Assessment Report [3; 62, pages 8 - 9 and 61; 63, section 9.3.3], 2007 Fourth Assessment Report [3; 60, page 7; 61, page 763; 685, section 3.2 on page 45], and 2013 Fifth Assessment Report [3; 59, page 1010], though they dropped to ~0.14°C/decade in their 1995 Second Assessment Report [3; 64, section F.2.1 on pages 39 - 40, and page 323]Their 2018 Special Report also projected ~0.2°C/decade of warming until about 2040, unless humans limit greenhouse gas emissions [83, figure SPM.1 on page 6 and page 81]. Figure 3 below helps compare these projected warming trends to global surface temperature trends over the past 2000 years, with ~0.2°C/decade being ~2°C per century on the figure's y-axis:


Figure 3: Global surface temperature trend over the past 2000 years back to 1 CE, based on instrumental data (thermometers) and reconstructions from indirect, proxy measurements of temperature [29; 30]. The instrumental data extends from 1850 - 2017 [31, figure 1a]. Each trend covers a period of 51 years, stated in units of °C/century, and ends on the year given on the x-axis. The horizontal lines represent the upper range of pre-industrial (pre-1850) warming rates from reconstructions (solid green line) or calculated by climate models (dashed orange line).
This figure is a simplification [29; 30] of a previously published analysis [31, figure 4a].

Multiproxy analyses confirm the instrumental warming trend [188, figure 1c; 475 - 481], as do other indirect measures that do not use thermometer data [476, figure 3; 477, figure 4; 482; 483, generated using 434, as per 435, with the re-analyses from 482 and 484]. For further discussion of industrial-era temperature trends relative to the distant past, see sections 2.5 and 2.7 of "Myth: Attributing Warming to CO2 Involves the Fallaciously Inferring Causation from a Mere Correlation".

Thus scenario B's trend of ~0.2°C/decade (~2°C per century), if continued for 51 years, would be over three times greater than the largest global surface warming trend from two millennia ago until 1900. Scenario B's trend is therefore a risky prediction, instead of a trivial prediction that is easy to make; i.e. scenario B's trend is akin to predicting zebras when one hears hoofbeats in Canada, instead of predicting horses, mules, or donkeys. A position gains more credibility from making risky predictions that are later borne out by evidence, than from making trivial predictions that are borne out [305, from 33:33 to 38:23; 514 - 517; 518, pages 9 - 10; 556], as even contrarians admit [280; 519 - 521; 570]. Observing scenario B's trend would thus provide strong support for the IPCC's position.

So how does scenario B's forecasted warming trend compare to observed post-1990 warming? To answer this question, one needs to examine analyses of global surface temperature trends. Re-analyses offer one tool for doing this, since re-analyses combine a diverse range of data, including surface thermometer records, satellite analyses, etc. [118 - 123]. Even climate contrarians/denialists use re-analyses. For example, Ryan Maue approves of the Japan Meteorological Agency's 55-year Re-analysis (JRA-55) [124; 125; 575; 636; 637], along with [124; 125] the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts' (ECMWF's) re-analyses ERA-I and its update ERA5 [119 - 123; 126, pages S18 - S19]. Judith Curry agrees with Maue on the use of re-analyses [127], says re-analyses should be used more often [127 - 130], and lauds ECMWF's re-analyses [128; 130]. Furthermore, contrarians such as John Christy [126, pages S17 and S18; 131; 132, pages 4 - 7; 133; 134, pages S16 and S17; 135; 136, page 104], Roy Spencer [135; 137; 635], Roger Pielke Sr. [131; 138; 139], Patrick Michaels [575; 636], Anthony Watts [140], Javier [632], and David Evans [141 - 143] also cite re-analyses. 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Modern-Era Retrospective Analysis for Research and Applications (NASA's MERRA-2) [149, sections 2.2, 7.1, and 7.3; 163, figure 8 on page 5654; 164; 165, figure 7a; 536, section 7 on page 5445; 645; 646] and the National Centers for Environmental Prediction's Climate Forecast System Re-analysis (NCEP's CFSR) [118, figure 18 on page 14622; 166, figure 4a on page 2293] are outlier re-analyses that conflict with both surface-based analyses and satellite-based analyses. In the case of MERRA-2, the MERRA-2 team notes that MERRA-2's outlier status may result from flaws in the re-analysis [536, section 7 on page 5445; 645; 646]. It may also stem from MERRA-2 only using weather balloon data for land surface trends, instead of other data sources [149, section 7.1; 164, section 5.1.1; 537, section 2c on page 5; 538]. Even the contrarian Maue recommends using ERA5 [124; 125] and JRA-55 [124; 125; 575; 636; 637] instead of MERRA-2 [124] or CFSR [124; 125]. This is because, according to Maue [125; 167, citing 557] and other sources [557; 558, page 204; 561, pages 1 and 2; 653], CFSR's data processing model changed in 2010 or 2011, such that pre-2011 CFSR results were not comparable to post-2011 results.

Maue speaks from experience when he discusses CFSR's problems, since he previously produced a graph of surface trends from the erroneous CFSR analysis. The Global Warming Policy Foundation (GWPF), a politically-motivated contrarian organization [638 - 644], then used Maue's dubious CFSR graph to claim no recent global warming occurred. The Foundation later admitted Maue's CFSR graph was wrong [169; 170], with contrarians such as [648 - 652] Roy Spencer [635], Joe Bastardi [600; 630], Anthony Watts [601; 602], and Pierre Gosselin [630] peddling the debunked graph or other similar CFSR analyses. Thus those who rely on CFSR for surface trends do so that their own risk. The contrarian Curry herself notes that CFSR conflicts with conventional analyses, including ERA-I; when discussing this, she remains inclined towards ERA-I [128]. The discontinuity in CFSR's model in 2010 or 2011 [125; 167, citing 557; 558, page 204; 561, pages 1 and 2; 653] may explain why the KNMI data repository includes CFSR results only up until about 2010, while extending other sources such as ERA-I and ERA-5 to post-2010 [168]; the scientists working on CFSR originally meant it to extend until 2009 [451; 453]. Consistent with this, CFSR shows about a third more warming than ERA5 until 2009 [559, generated using 434, as per 435], while showing substantially less warming afterwards [560, generated using 434, as per 435].

In contrast to re-analyses, other temperature analyses focus on just instrumental records from thermometers. Among these, Curry endorses the Berkeley Earth surface analysis [251; 252], along with the HadCRUT4 analysis [252] from the Hadley Centre of the United Kingdom Met Office and the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia; she formerly worked with Berkeley Earth on their analysis [249 - 251] and expressed pleasure in how it turned out [251]. Even the contrarian Anthony Watts, of the blog WattsUpWithThat, approved of Berkeley Earth's methods and said he would accept their results even if they showed he was wrong [522]. He promptly went back on his word [523 - 527]; Berkeley Earth's fossil-fuel-industry-funded [533 - 535] results rebutted Watts' position [528] and confirmed the evidence-based [83, page 57; 99; 109; 144; 184, chapter 3; 185, pages 22 - 24; 186 - 242] scientific consensus [243, table 1; 244; 245, page 49; 246, figure 2 v007 on page 11; 247, page 28 in chapter 2; 248] on CO2-induced [446; 529, paragraph 29 of section 5, citing 446; 531; 532] warming [83, pages 57 - 58; 162; 164, figure 1; 446; 529; 530].

In addition to Berkeley Earth and HadCRUT4, other instrumental surface analyses exist as well. This includes two analyses that under-estimate recent warming due to their poorer coverage of the globe: the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) surface temperature record [144, page 4014; 145; 149, sections 4 and 6; 153, section 3.1; 539, cited by 573] and the Japan Meteorological Agency's (JMA) surface analysis [144, page 4014; 146, section 7.4; 539, cited by 573; 633, section 2b on page 4681]. However, more recent work shows improved coverage in the NOAA analysis [634; 673]. HadCRUT4 also under-estimates warming due to limited coverage [83, page 57; 147; 148; 149, sections 4 and 6; 150, figure 1, sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3; 151 - 162; 539, cited by 573], as admitted by members of the Hadley Centre team [157]. In fact, HadCRUT4 [83, page 57; 147 - 162; 539, cited by 573], NOAA [144, page 4014; 145; 149, sections 4 and 6; 153, section 3.1; 539, cited by 573], JMA [144, page 4014; 146, section 7.4; 539, cited by 573; 633, section 2b on page 4681], and MERRA-2 [149, section 7.1; 165, figure 7a; 536, section 7 on page 5445; 645; 646] each under-estimate surface warming in the Arctic, one of the most rapidly warming regions on Earth [147; 152; 165; 478; 540, figure 2; 541 - 543], which contributes to these analyses under-estimating global warmingTaken together, these points imply that the CFSR, MERRA-2, JMA, HadCRUT4, and NOAA trends (in order from lowest reliability to highest reliability for recent surface trends) should carry less weight than the other analyses.

And as a final note: over the oceans, observational analyses use temperature trends for the surface water [4, "Methods" section; 83, page 57; 150, section 2.3.2; 162; 337; 631], while the model-based projection uses temperature trends for the air above the water [4, "Methods" section; 28, figure 6.11 on page 190]. Several papers show that performing a more accurate comparison using the same metric (air trends or surface water trends) for both the projections and observational analyses, would decrease the model-based projected warming trend or increase the observational analyses' warming trend [4, "Methods" section; 83, page 57; 150, section 2.3.2; 162; 337; 631], though one paper disputes this point [622; figures 12, 13, and table 1]. However, this blogpost's analysis will not include this more accurate comparison. The absence of this comparison actually benefits the myth, since it keeps the model-based warming projection larger and thus gives the projection a better chance of over-estimating warming [4, "Methods" section; 83, page 57; 150, section 2.3.2; 162; 337; 631]. So if the myth fails even with this factor unfairly weighted in its favor, then the myth truly lacks merit.

Figure 4 below presents post-1990 surface temperature trends from these analyses, in comparison to FAR scenario B's best estimate of ~0.2°C/decade [28, page xxii, figure 9 on page xxiii, and figure A.9 on page 336]:




Figure 4: 1990 - 2019 surface temperature trends for the IPCC 1990 First Assessment Report's Scenario B projection [28, page xxii, figure 9 on page xxiii, and figure A.9 on page 336], in comparison to temperature trends from various (A) instrumental analyses [256 - 265; 464] (B) and re-analyses [458 - 460, generated using 434, as per 435; 461 - 463]. Scenario B, in contrast to the Business-as-Usual scenario or scenario A [28, figure 6 on page xx, figure 2.4 on page 56, and figure A.6 on page 335], better represents the post-1990 observed energy impact (radiative forcing) of greenhouse gas increases [65, figures 9, 11, 12, S2, S3, and S15; 108, figure 3 on page 46; 117, figure 4; 272, figure 8.18 on page 699; 657, figure 1], as per section 2.2.

The instrumental analyses are: the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature analysis [162; 446] ; the Goddard Institute for Space Studies Surface Temperature analysis version 4 (GISTEMPv4) from NASA [164] ; HadCRUT4 from the Hadley Centre of the United Kingdom Met Office and the Climatic Research Unit of the University of East Anglia [146] ; Kevin Cowtan and Robert Way's updates of HadCRUT4 [148; 155] with sea surface temperature data-sets such as Hadley Sea Surface Temperature version 4 (HadSST4) [109; 627] ; the NOAA's global analysis [145; 447; 634; 693] ; and the Japan Meteorological Agency's global analysis (JMA) [144; 146]. More recent work shows improved coverage in the NOAA analysis [634; 673]. The China Meteorological Agency (CMA) also offers global instrumental analysis with greater coverage [673; 674], but this CMA analysis currently extends to 2018, not 2019 [674]. Its 1990 - 2018 trend is 0.18°C/decade [674].

The re-analyses are: the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts' Re-analysis 5 (ERA5) [119 - 123; 126, pages S18 - S19], which serves as the recent update to the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts' Interim re-analysis (ERA-I) [119 - 123; 126, pages S18 - S19] ; the Japan Meteorological Agency's 55-year Re-analysis (JRA-55) [454 - 457] ; the National Centers for Environmental Prediction's Reanalysis-2 (NCEP-2) [473; 474] ; NASA's Modern-Era Retrospective Analysis for Research and Applications (MERRA-2) [448; 449] ; and the National Centers for Environmental Prediction's Climate Forecast System Re-analysis (CFSR) [450 - 453]. The NOAA's 20th Century Re-analysis (20CR) [476; 675; 676, generated using 434, as per 435] and the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts' Atmospheric Reanalysis of the 20th century (ERA-20C) [476; 484; 676, generated using 434, as per 435] do not even currently reach up to 2016 [676, generated using 434, as per 435], and thus were not included in this figure.

The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2018 Special Report presents warming trends from the following analyses: Berkeley Earth, GISTEMP, Cowtan + Way, NOAA, HadCRUT4, JMA, ERA-I, and JRA-55 [83, pages 57 - 58].

The outlier status of MERRA-2 [149, sections 2.2, 7.1, and 7.3; 163, figure 8 on page 5654; 164; 165, figure 7a; 536, section 7 on page 5445; 645; 646] and CFSR [118, figure 18 on page 14622; 166, figure 4a on page 2293] stem largely from MERRA-2 under-estimating warming [149, section 7.1; 165, figure 7a; 536, section 7 on page 5445; 645; 646] in the rapidly warming Arctic [147; 152; 165; 478; 540, figure 2; 541 - 543], and CFSR shifting the model it uses to assimilate data in 2010 or 2011 [125; 167, citing 557; 558, page 204; 561, pages 1 and 2; 653]; the scientists working on CFSR originally meant it to extend until 2009 [451; 453]. Consistent with this, CFSR shows about a third more warming than ERA5 until 2009 [559, generated using 434, as per 435], while showing substantially less warming afterwards [560, generated using 434, as per 435]. So resolving CFSR's model shift would likely further support scenario B's projected warming trend.

One might object that these average temperature trends lack error bars. But that objection does not help the myth proponents' case, since the proponents tend to focus on average trends [1, from 1:08 - 4:40; 6 - 16; 17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 19 - 25; 26, page 5; 27; 32 - 36; 114; 116; 171; 254; 282; 283; 496; 506; 507; 509; 511; 512; 544; 546 - 548; 549, pages 396 - 398 and figure 12-7; 550; 551; 606; 612; 624; 626; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18; 690, pages 3, 8, and 9], as figure 4 does. Moreover, appealing to error bars would further undermine the myth advocates' position, since, for instance, most of the error bars would comfortably overlap with the IPCC's ~0.2°C/decade trend for scenario B [28, page xxii, figure 9 on page xxiii, and figure A.9 on page 336], especially once one includes the uncertainty range for scenario B's average trend [28, figure 6.11 on page 190]. Take, for example, the 1990 - 2019 warming trends shown below, with +/- 2σ statistical uncertainty (in °C/decade):
  • Berkeley Earth [162; 446]   :   0.20  +/-  0.05 [256; 257]
  • NASA's GISTEMPv4 [164]   :   0.21  +/-  0.06 [256; 258; 259]
  • Cowtan + Way [148; 155]  :   0.20  +/-  0.06 [256; 260]
  • C+W with HadSST4 [109; 627]   :   0.20  +/-  0.06 [256; 260; 261]
  • NOAA [145; 447; 634; 693]   :   0.20  +/-  0.07 [256; 262; 263]
  • HadCRUT4 [146]   :   0.17  +/-  0.06 [256; 264; 265]
(The uncertainty estimates decrease further, once one takes a pooled average of the analyses [126, pages S17 and S18; 134, page S16]. As time progresses beyond 2019, the statistical uncertainty for the trends should decrease even more, as one would expect with a larger sample size [256; 434, as per 435].)

Alternatively, one might be tempted to note that, for example, HadCRUT4 [8; 14; 15; 17, figure 6; 18, figure 4; 19; 23 - 25; 496; 544; 546 - 548; 550; 551; 626], JMA, MERRA-2, and CFSR temperature trends substantially differ from scenario B's best estimate of ~0.2°C/decade [28, page xxii, figure 9 on page xxiii, and figure A.9 on page 336]. For instance, the myth advocates Christopher Monckton [17, figure 6; 18, figure 4], Clive Best [14; 15], Willie Soon [17, figure 6; 18, figure 4], David Legates [17, figure 6; 18, figure 4], Javier [8; 254], and William M. Briggs [17, figure 6; 18 figure 4] cherry-pick HadCRUT4 to compare to FAR's BaU projected trend. But cherry-picking these analyses would run fall afoul of the aforementioned notes, such as the poorer global coverage of HadCRUT4 [83, page 57; 147; 148; 149, section 4; 150, figure 1, sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3; 151 - 162; 633, section 2b on page 4681] and JMA [144, page 4014; 146, section 7.4; 633, section 2b on page 4681], CFSR's model shift in 2011 [125; 167, citing 557; 558, page 204; 561, pages 1 and 2; 653], and Maue's (who Curry agrees with on re-analyses [127]) advice to opt for ERA5 [124; 125] and JRA-55 [124; 125; 575; 636; 637] over MERRA-2 [124] and CFSR [124; 125]

When one looks at the analyses as a whole, the majority of analyses, particularly the analyses with better global coverage, remain consistent with scenario B's projected trend, as per figure 4. Thus the IPCC noted in their 2007 Fourth Assessment Report [562, pages 10 and 12; 685, section 3.2 on page 45] and in their 2018 Special Report that human-made [83, pages 4 and 57 - 59] global warming continues at ~0.2°C/decade [83, pages 4 and 57 - 59; 562, pages 10 and 12], consistent with FAR's projection [562, page 12] and climate models [83, pages 4 and 57 - 59]. Berkeley Earth noted about the same warming trend as well [670]. So the myth fails. Other academic [4; 5; 150; 172 - 174] and non-academic sources [3; 113; 175 - 182; 616; 617] similarly note that recent surface warming trends remain consistent with model-based predictions. I discuss this issue further in section 2.2 of "Myth: Santer et al. Show that Climate Models are Very Flawed" and in section 2.4 of "Myth: Attributing Warming to CO2 Involves the Fallaciously Inferring Causation from a Mere Correlation"

What makes this consistency particularly impressive is that the IPCC's temperature trend scenarios only included warming from increases in greenhouse gases [28, pages xi, xviii - xxiii, 190, and 331 - 336], not changes in other factors such as sulfate aerosols [28, page 64; 64, page 13] or solar irradiance. So the IPCC successfully predicted subsequent global warming by focusing on greenhouse gas increases, supporting the evidence-based [83, page 57; 99; 109; 144; 184, chapter 3; 185, pages 22 - 24; 186 - 242] scientific consensus [243, table 1; 244; 245, page 49; 246, figure 2 v007 on page 11; 247, page 28 in chapter 2; 248] that humans caused most of the recent global warming, primarily via increasing greenhouse gas levels.

This accurate warming prediction ties into other predicted effects of warming. For instance, the warming prediction should impact sea level rise predictions, since surface warming contributes to sea level rise by melting land ice and causing thermal expansion of water [28, page xi; 317; 371 - 375]. The IPCC 1990 FAR projected this global sea level increase for BaU and the other scenarios [28, page xi, figure 12 on page 30, figure 14 on page xxxi, figure 9.7 on page 277, and figure A.12 on page 337], with BaU's high, best, and low estimates [28, figure 12 on page 30] being as follows:

"under the IPCC Business as Usual emissions scenario, an average rate of global mean sea level rise of about 6cm per decade over the next century (with an uncertainty range of 3 - 10cm per decade) [28, page xi]."

By 2018, the BaU projection reaches a best estimate of ~15cm of post-1990 global sea level rise, while scenarios B, C, and D each reach ~11cm [28, figure 14 on page xxxi, figure 9.7 on page 277, and figure A.12 on page 337]. Observed post-1990 sea level rise was ~9cm [126, page S84; 376 - 379], between [115, section 1.3.4.1 on page 136 and figure 1.10 on page 137; 604] the low estimate of ~5cm and the best estimate of ~11cm for scenario B [28, figure 9.7 on page 277]. Thus the IPCC 1990 report predicted warming-induced global sea level rise reasonably well, in addition to accurately predicting global surface warming, contrary to the insinuations [505; 614] made by the conspiracy theorist [497 - 504] Tony Heller. As the IPCC noted in their 2019 Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere (Earth's solid water):

"It is now nearly three decades since the first assessment report of the IPCC, and over that time evidence and confidence in observed and projected ocean and cryosphere changes have grown (very high confidence [...]). Confidence in climate warming and its anthropogenic [a.k.a. human-made] causes has increased across assessment cycles; robust detection was not yet possible in 1990, but has been characterised as unequivocal since AR4 in 2007. Projections of near-term warming rates in early reports have been realised over the subsequent decades, while projections have tended to err on the side of caution for sea level rise and ocean heat uptake that have developed faster than predicted [...] [495, page 1-13 in section 1.4]."


Section 2.2: An Additional Means of Showing that the IPCC 1990 Report Accurately Predicted Post-1990 Surface Warming and Short-term Climate Sensitivity to Greenhouse Gas Increases


Section 2.1 assessed the accuracy of the IPCC's forecasts by comparing observed warming to scenario B, since scenario B better matched observed greenhouse gas increases than did BaU, as per supplementary section 2.1. This assessment followed option 1 from section 2.1. In this section, I will use a version of option 3 by comparing observed post-1990 greenhouse-gas-induced radiative forcing increases with the increases projected in the IPCC's 1990 FAR scenarios. Given this, it would help to review what radiative forcing means in the context of how greenhouse gases cause warming. I cover this subject below, and in more detail in sections 2.2 and 2.5 of "Myth: Attributing Warming to CO2 Involves the Fallaciously Inferring Causation from a Mere Correlation".

First, an analogy: imagine an open pot of water, placed over a fire. The pot takes in energy from the fire, and also releases energy into the environment. One can add fuel to the fire, strengthening the fire and thus adding more energy to the pot, generating an energy imbalance in which the pot takes in more energy that the pot releases. The pot warms in response, releasing more energy as it warms; the more sensitive the pot is to the energy imbalance, the more the pot warms. The pot will stop warming in response to the pot releasing as much energy than the pot takes in, yielding an energy balance and an equilibrium in which the pot takes in about as much energy as it releases

Earth's climate operates on the same general principle of temperature changes in response to an energy imbalance. Earth's surface takes in shorter-wavelength (higher energy) solar radiation and releases longer-wavelength (lower energy) radiation. If Earth releases less energy than it takes in, then this creates an energy imbalance, which results in Earth warming [197; 284, chapter 4; 285 - 290]. Greenhouse gases such as CO2 and CH4, emit radiation and transfer energy via colliding with other molecules. CO2 also absorbs some of the longer-wavelength radiation emitted by the Earth, but not incoming shorter-wavelength solar radiation, with CO2 absorbing radiation in specific wavelengths [284, chapter 4; 290 - 304; 305, from 9:13 to 10:28]. Thus greenhouse gases such as CO2 engage in radiative forcing [28, page xiii; 108; 197; 272, section 8.1; 288; 290 - 292; 294 - 298; 306, from 3:18 to 4:45; 307; 691], slow the rate at which Earth releases energy, and cause an energy imbalance [197; 284, chapter 4; 285 - 290; 297; 299; 307; 510; 623] that results in warming. CO2-induced warming also melts solar-radiation-reflecting ice, increases water vapor levels, and affects cloud cover; this increases the amount of shorter-wavelength solar radiation absorbed by the Earth [308 - 310]. 

Climate sensitivity states how much warming results from increased radiative forcing [306; 311; 312]. Positive feedbacks increase climate sensitivity by amplifying warming in response to warming, while negative feedbacks limit climate sensitivity by mitigating warming in response to warming [311; 313; 314]. Equilibrium climate sensitivity, a.k.a. ECS, is climate sensitivity for up to the point at which Earth reaches an equilibrium state where Earth releases as much energy as it takes in, and fast feedbacks (as opposed to slower acting feedbacks) have exerted their full effect [266; 311; 312; 317]. Transient climate sensitivity, a.k.a. TCS or TCR, is Earth's climate sensitivity over a shorter period of time, before Earth reaches equilibrium [266; 311; 312]. Different scientists give different definitions for forms of climate sensitivity [315; 316], but the aforementioned definitions should suffice for this blogpost.

One can summarize the aforementioned points as follows:
  1. Increases in greenhouse gases cause an energy imbalance [197; 284, chapter 4; 285 - 290; 297; 299; 307; 510].
  2. Radiative forcing [65; 107 - 109; 117; 186; 272, figure 8.18 on page 699; 273 - 276] serves as an estimate of that [28, page xiii; 108; 197; 272, section 8.1; 288; 290 - 292; 294 - 298; 306, from 3:18 to 4:45; 307] energy imbalance, which is often stated in terms of radiative forcing increase per doubling of CO2 concentration.
  3. Climate sensitivity represents how much warming occurs per increase in radiative forcing [266; 311; 312; 315 - 317].
A number of myth proponents argue for lower climate sensitivity, which would be expected in light of their claim that the IPCC over-estimated greenhouse-gas-induced warming, combined with the fact that lower climate sensitivity implies less greenhouse-gas-induced warming. These myth proponents include Judith Curry [339; 380], Christopher Monckton [1, from 4:41 to 7:42; 16; 17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 114], Willie Soon [17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 26, page 5], David Legates [17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4], David Evans [381, pages 15 - 18; 382], and William M. Briggs [17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4].

With those points in place, one can move on to comparing FAR's projected greenhouse-gas-induced radiative forcing increase [28, figure 6 on page xx, figure 2.4 on page 56, and figure A.6 on page 335] with the observed forcing increase. This comparison reveals that the observed radiative forcing increase [65, figures 9, 11, 12, S2, S3, and S15; 108, figure 3 on page 46; 117, figure 4; 272, figure 8.18 on page 699; 657, figure 1] matches scenario B, as per figure 5 below. And since the observed warming trend also matches scenario B (see section 2.1), then the IPCC 1990 projection matched the observed ratio of warming vs. increased radiative forcing. So the IPCC accurately represented shorter-term climate sensitivity, as also shown in published research [4, figures 2, S2, and S6; 5]. We thus ended up with scenario's B forcing and warming trends, though in comparison to scenario B, we got there using more of some greenhouse gases and less of others, as per supplementary section 2.1. Therefore, many greenhouse gas pathways exist for getting to the same trend, as the IPCC notes [566, page 38, cited by 28 on pages 331 and 337].


Figure 5: (Top panel) Projected greenhouse-gas-induced radiative forcing increase for the IPCC First Assessment Report's four scenarios [28, figure A.6 on page 335]. The greenhouse gases included are CO2, CH4, N2O, CFC-11, CFC-12, and HCFC-22 [28, pages 332 - 335]. (Bottom panel) Observed radiative forcing increase as a sum of the contribution for the greenhouse gases listed, relative to 1750 for radiative forcing and indexed to 1 for AGGI [117]. The AGGI measures the climate-warming influence of long-lived greenhouse gases, relative to the pre-industrial era, in terms of increased radiative forcing [104; 117]. For example, 2018's AGGI value of 1.43 and 1990's value of 1.00 indicates that greenhouse-gas-induced radiative forcing increased by 43% from 1990 to 2018.

HCFC-22 is among the 15 minor greenhouse gases included in "15-minor" [117]. So the bottom panel actually contains radiative forcing from more greenhouse gases than in the top panel. This fails to undermine section 2.2's analysis for at least two reasons. First, suppose one removes the other 14 greenhouse gases from "15-minor" in the bottom panel, in order to match the greenhouse gases that IPCC FAR projected in the top panel. This would lower the observed radiative forcing further way from BaU and further reduce the rate of predicted warming, which is the opposite of what the myth requires. Second, the 14 other greenhouse gases exert a relatively small effect in terms of the difference between the bottom panel's observed radiative forcing vs. the top panel's projected radiative forcings.

The top and bottom panels slightly differ in their initial radiative forcing value in 1990, due to changes in how radiative forcing was estimated in research [65; 107 - 109; 117; 186; 272, figure 8.18 on page 699; 273 - 276] since the IPCC 1990 First Assessment Report [28, table 2.2 on page 52]; the changes were in place by the IPCC 2001 Third Assessment Report [370, pages 356 - 358]. However, the initial value for radiative forcing is not what is important for this blogpost. Instead, the post-1990 net increase in radiative forcing is what is important, since that increase will determine the magnitude of post-1990 warming, as discussed earlier in the section. So one would compare the IPCC's post-1990 projected increases in the top panel [28, page 335], to the observed post-1990 increases in the bottom panel [117].

Water vapor is not included include in this figure because water vapor is not a long-lived greenhouse gas. Instead water vapor is a condensing greenhouse gas with a shorter atmospheric residence time [272, FAQ 8.1 on pages 666 and 667; 318, section 7.3.3; 319, page 80; 320 - 323], and acts as a positive feedback that amplifies warming [324 - 335] from longer-term drivers, instead of driving longer-term warming [272, FAQ 8.1 on pages 666 and 667; 320 - 322]. I discuss this more in sections 2.2 and 2.3 of "Myth: Attributing Warming to CO2 Involves the Fallaciously Inferring Causation from a Mere Correlation".


Section 2.3: Responses to Some Possible Objections to the Accuracy of the IPCC's 1990 Forecast


Below are some possible objections to my defense of the IPCC's 1990 forecasts in sections 2.1 and 2.2, along with my rebuttal of these objections:


Objection 1: Observed CO2 emissions match those from BaU. So BaU is the appropriate scenario for comparison, contrary to what sections 2.1 and 2.2 claim [6; 13; 255]. This makes sense, since there were not really many effective policies put in place to limit greenhouse gas emissions [508].

Response 1: Post-1990 CO2 emissions [66; 67; 68, figure S.1 on page 5; 567, figure SPM.2 on page 5] were closer to BaU than to the other scenarios [28, figure A.2(a) on page 331] (for those reading the published literature on this subject: the conversion factor from gigatons of carbon to gigatons of CO2 is 44/12). However, objection 1 unjustifiably ignores non-CO2 greenhouse gases, as per section 2.1. For example, it ignores the fact that the Montreal Protocol led to mitigation of CFC emissions [87 - 96; 97, pages 599 and 600; 98, page S19; 99 - 102; 629, pages 27.31, 27.32, and 27.44; 657], which the IPCC acknowledged was largely absent from BaU [566, pages xxiii - xxiv, cited by 28 on pages 331 and 337]. And objection 1 ignores the fact that, in response to factors such as the collapse of the Soviet Union [103; 106, page 506; 470 - 472], post-1990 CH4 emissions [67; 68, figure S.1 on page 5; 69; 567, figure SPM.2 on page 5] were far below BaU [28, figure A.2(b) on page 331], even if one grants that FAR contained a typo (gigaton [28, figure A.2(b) on page 331] instead of megaton or teragram [566, page 14 and table 2.8 on pages 26 - 29, cited by 28 on pages 331 and 337]) that erroneously exaggerated BaU's projected CH4 emissions by a factor of 1000. So proponents of objection 1 engage in cherry-picking when they use CO2 emissions to argue for focusing on BaU, while ignoring non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions. Objection 1 further side-steps the effect of sinks on greenhouse gases, such as, for instance, how the Soviet Union's collapse changed land use practices in a way that increased land uptake of CO2 [466 - 469] and thus limited atmospheric CO2 levels [68, figure S.1 on page 5; 665 - 668].

Objection 1 also avoids the fact that only greenhouse gas increases that stay in the atmosphere continue to cause warming. So, for instance, suppose human activity emits X amount of CO2, and then oceans, plants, etc. take up ~60% of that CO2, leading to atmospheric CO2 levels increasing by only 0.4X (40% of X). This 0.4X would contribute to further warming via the radiative forcing discussed in section 2.2, not the other ~60% CO2 increase taken up by oceans, plants, etc. Thus the greenhouse gas increase remaining in the atmosphere warms the Earth, not the greenhouse gases taken up. Since scenario B, in comparison to BaU, better represents increases in greenhouse gases remaining in the atmosphere (as per supplementary section 2.1), then scenario B would be the better scenario to focus on, contrary to objection 1.

This point ties into the climate's sensitivity to greenhouse gas increases. CO2-induced warming, as estimated by the climate sensitivity discussed in section 2.2, depends on net changes in atmospheric CO2, not just humanity's total emission of CO2. Objection 1 therefore fails to undermine high climate sensitivity, since objection 1 focuses on man-made emissions, not net changes in atmospheric CO2. So myth proponents who defend low estimates of climate sensitivity (ex: the myths proponents discussed in section 2.2) cannot cherry-pick a comparison with BaU in order to argue for their low sensitivity. Moreover, climate sensitivity is relatively high, regardless of whether one examines it relative to cumulative greenhouse emissions [268 - 270; 681] or relative to net changes in atmospheric CO2 [109; 266, figure 1; 267; 571; 572; 577; 615]; see sections 2.5 and 2.7 of "Myth: Attributing Warming to CO2 Involves the Fallaciously Inferring Causation from a Mere Correlation" for more on this.

One might be tempted to defend objection 1 by saying that CO2 should have a greater warming effect than the other non-CO2 greenhouse gases, and thus one should focus on CO2 emissions instead of non-CO2 emissions. However, this defense misses the point. When deciding which projection scenario to focus on, the issue is not comparing different greenhouse gases to each another; instead the issue is comparing the projected scenarios to the observed changes. And when one does that for all the greenhouse gases taken together, not just CO2, then scenario B better matches the observed greenhouse gas changes and radiative forcing changes than does BaU, as argued in supplementary section 2.1 and section 2.2.


Objection 2: The IPCC offered a largely useless, or false, forecast in 1990, since their projections differed from subsequently observed greenhouse gas levels and emissions.

Response 2: This objection badly misses the mark on multiple fronts. For instance, objection 2 states that the BaU projection's "If [...], then [...]" conditional is false. But in logic, a conditional is false only if the conditional's consequent "then [...]" portion would be false in scenarios where the conditional's antecedent "If [...]" portion would be true. This makes intuitive sense; the conditional states that the consequent follows from the antecedent, so the only way to falsify the conditional is a scenario in which the consequent fails to follow when the antecedent is true. Yet the BaU's conditional antecedent is not true for the post-1990 period, since greenhouse gas increases were all less than in BaU, and BaU over-estimated emissions for a number of the gases, as per section 2.1, section 2.2, and supplementary section 2.1. Thus the observed emissions, greenhouse gas levels, and temperature trends do not meet the conditions for falsifying BaU. It would be illogical to claim otherwise, which makes objection 2 illogical.

The following analogy helps reveal further flaws in objection 2. Suppose a fire safety engineer uses a combustion model, among other sources, to project that adding:
  • Y amount of gasoline would cause a fire to grow by Z size
  • 2Y amount of gasoline would cause a fire to grow by 2Z size
  • 3Y amount of gasoline would cause a fire to grow by 3Z size
  • 4Y amount of gasoline would cause a fire to grow by 4Z size
Each projection thus has a ratio of Z increase in fire size per Y amount of gasoline added.

After the fire safety engineer offered their projections, people added 3.5Y amount of gasoline to the fire. None of the model-based projections specifically included 3.5Y gasoline. But based on the projections' aforementioned ratio, one can predict the 3.5Y gasoline would cause the fire to grow to 3.5Z size. And it turned out the fire did actually grow 3.5Z size after people added 3.5Y gasoline, confirming the model-based prediction. Thus one could assess the accuracy of the underlying model used to generate the engineer's projections, even though the antecedent condition for the engineer's four projections did not exactly match the amount of gasoline added to the fire. 

Analogously, one can assess the accuracy of the underlying model used to generate the IPCC's projections, even though the IPCC's four projections did not exactly match the observed greenhouse gas increases and emissions. One can do this using the options listed in section 2.1, including estimating warming per unit of energy impact by greenhouse gases (i.e. climate sensitivity, as per section 2.2) [4; 5; 113], analogous to increase in fire size per unit of gasoline increase from the engineer's projections. Therefore one can extend the IPCC's model-based projections to generate real-world, testable predictions. So the projections are useful in that respect.

The IPCC's projections were also useful beyond providing a testable prediction, as shown in the following example. Suppose a doctor told a patient that if the patient smoked two packs of cigarettes per day for twenty years, then the patient's risk of lung cancer would substantially increase in comparison to if the patient had never smoked. The doctor bases their projection, in part, on epidemiological models tested against past observational analyses of data on smoking and lung cancer. Scientific evidence shows a dose-dependent relationship between smoking and health risks; i.e. the more one smokes, the greater the risk, with even low levels of smoking coming with increased health risks over never smoking [618 - 621]. The point of the doctor's projection was not to accurately predict whether the patient never smoked, vs. smoked two packs per day, vs. smoked three cigarettes per day, etc. Instead the doctor offered a conditional projection which the patient could then use to help inform the patient's decision on smoking. It is then up to the patient to decide how much they will smoke, if they decide to smoke at all.

Similarly, the IPCC need not accurately predict subsequent greenhouse gas levels or emissions, in order for them to offer projections that people could then use to inform their decision on topics such as greenhouse-gas-emitting industries. The projections are not false/useless for having failed to exactly match the observed greenhouse gas levels and emissions, anymore than the doctor's projection was false/useless just because it failed to precisely match subsequently observed levels of smoking from the patient. The projections were meant to inform people on a possible future, not state which future would actually occur nor exactly predict what future decisions people would actually make. 

This fits with people's everyday use of projections. For instance, suppose your friend gave different projections for how long it would take you to get to work, based on whether you walked, vs. took the bus, vs. took the train, vs. drove a car, etc. Now suppose in reality, you took your car, and that car broke down on your way to work. It would be ridiculous to claim your friend's projections were useless, just because none of the projections included in their antecedent conditions that your car would break down. Your friend's projections were still useful when you planned your means of getting to work (ex: they helped you rule out walking as taking too long); just as the IPCC's projections could be useful for planning, even if they do not include every condition that actually occurred. 

Thus objection 2 engages in special pleading (or a double-standard) by applying an unfair standard to dismiss the IPCC's projections, when the objector likely would not apply that standard to dismiss projections in other contexts in which planning occurs, including medicine and fire safety, as per the previously discussed analogies. The objector therefore engages in motivated reasoning [485 - 492; 493, from 37:54 to 44:55, discussing 487; 494] on climate science. If they would apply their objection to these other types of situation, then they undermine their ability to plan, while objecting to well-supported and confirmed predictions. And that would serve as a reductio ad absurdum for their objection.


Objection 3: The post-1990 warming was not due to greenhouse gases.

Response 3: Unless the proponent of objection 3 offers evidence in support of their objection, their objection amounts to evading and moving the goalposts away from the IPCC accurately forecasting a trend. The objector does not want to admit that the IPCC's prediction was right, so the objector acts as if it is just a coincidence that the IPCC accurately represented the amount of warming per unit of energy impact from greenhouse gas increases. Such a proposed coincidence strains credulity, especially since human-made increases in greenhouse gases caused most of the warming [83, page 57; 99; 109; 144; 184, chapter 3; 185, pages 22 - 24; 186 - 242], as discussed in "Myth: Attributing Warming to CO2 Involves the Fallaciously Inferring Causation from a Mere Correlation" and "Myth: El Niño Caused Post-1997 Global Warming". Objection 3 therefore fails. Figure 6 below illustrates this point by attributing surface temperature trends to various factors:


Figure 6: Global surface temperature trend from 1850 - 2017 relative to a baseline of 1850 - 1879 (observations), with the contribution of various factors to this temperature trend (colored lines) [109; 110]. The gray line is the sum of each of the depicted colored lines. The surface temperature trend takes into account changes in sea surface temperature measuring practices during the 1930s and 1940s [109 - 112; 622, figure 8; 628], which I elaborate more on in "Myth: Karl et al. of the NOAA Misleadingly Altered Ocean Temperature Records to Increase Global Warming". The authors of this figure adapted it from the results of their 2019 paper [109; 110; 599]. 

An alternative version of objection 3 starts by claiming that less than 0.5°C of post-1990 warming occurred [568; 569]. Yet FAR said 0.5°C warming must occur before one could say with high confidence that the increased greenhouse effect went beyond natural variability, and that the only possible explanation was that this effect was as strong as predicted by climate models [28, section 8.4 on page 253]. One therefore cannot yet claim with high confidence that greenhouse-gas-induced warming surpassed natural variability and matched climate models [568; 569]. Ronald Bailey of Reason magazine is a prominent defender of this form of objection 3 [568; 569]. 

There are at least two problems with this objection. First, the evidence for strong greenhouse-gas-induced warming comes from numerous lines of evidence, not just post-1990 warming trends, as covered in "Myth: Attributing Warming to CO2 Involves the Fallaciously Inferring Causation from a Mere Correlation". That is compatible with FAR's self-admittedly arbitrary 0.5°C claim [28, section 8.4 on page 253], since being the only possible explanation is a more stringent condition than being the best, most well-supported explanation. Second, 0.5°C of post-1990 warming already occurred, as per figures 4 and 6. So by the objector's own logic, the increased greenhouse effect discussed in section 2.2 is beyond natural variability, such that the only possible explanation is that models were right about the strength of the greenhouse effect that causes warming via the mechanisms discussed in section 2.2.


Objection 4: The observed warming trends largely match the best estimate from scenario B, which uses an equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) of 2.1°C. This falls on the lower end of the IPCC's 2013 range of 1.5°C - 4.5°C, supporting a lukewarmer position in which global surface temperature is less sensitive to changes in greenhouse gas levels.

Response 4: Objection 4 implicitly rejects the myth, since the objection admits the IPCC's predicted warming trend was accurate. In response to that accurate prediction, the objection now moves the goal-posts to how sensitive the climate is to greenhouse gas increases, as per climate sensitivity, which I discussed more in section 2.2. And it is true that the IPCC FAR best estimate uses an ECS of 2.5°C [28, pages xxii, xxv, 189, and 336], with Dana Nuccitelli of SkepticalScience arguing that given changes in estimates of radiative forcing, the corresponding ECS is actually 2.1°C [113; 564, pages 82 - 84]. There were changes in how radiative forcing was estimated in research [65; 107 - 109; 117; 186; 272, figure 8.18 on page 699; 273 - 276] since the IPCC 1990 First Assessment Report [28, table 2.2 on page 52], with the changes being in place by the IPCC 2001 Third Assessment Report [370, pages 356 - 358], consistent with what Nuccitelli notes [113; 564, pages 82 - 84].

But even given that point, objection 4 still errs in arguing for an ECS of ~2°C, for reasons I discuss in section 2.5 of "Myth: Attributing Warming to CO2 Involves the Fallaciously Inferring Causation from a Mere Correlation". For instance, other sources of evidence, such as greenhouse gas changes and temperature changes in the distant past (i.e. paleoclimate), argue for a larger ECS [266, figure 3 on page 6; 315; 317; 336]. Moreover, IPCC FAR uses an energy budget model to estimate ECS [28, pages xxii, xxv, 187, and 336]. Subsequent research showed that energy budget models, in comparison to other methods of estimating climate sensitivity, often generate lower estimates [266, page 3; 298; 337 - 340] due to a number of limitations [266, page 3; 306, from 18:02 to 47:50; 337; 341 - 352; 353, section 2; 354 - 360; 677 - 679]. These limitations include under-estimating actual rates of historical warming [266, page 3; 337], assuming that climate sensitivity for future CO2-induced warming is equivalent to climate sensitivity over the past century or so [266, page 3; 306, from 18:02 to 47:50; 311; 313; 338; 349 - 351; 353, section 2; 354 - 359; 605], and inaccurately representing the influence of sulfate aerosols on Earth's temperature [267; 341; 343]. This last problem would be especially significant for FAR, since FAR's projections failed to even include a quantified cooling effect of sulfate aerosols [28, page 64; 64, page 13]. 

Addressing the aforementioned limitations results in higher estimates of climate sensitivity [266, page 3; 267; 306, from 18:02 to 47:50; 337; 341; 343 - 349; 353; 356 - 360; 571; 572; 605; 677 - 679] that are closer to paleoclimate estimates (paleoclimate estimates that use data covering time-periods longer [266, figure 3; 315; 317; 336; 359; 361; 577; 579; 580; 603] than the past century or so of observations used in energy-budget-model-based estimates [266, page 3; 298; 311; 313; 337; 338; 341 - 347; 349 - 351; 353, section 2; 354; 357 - 360]). So the climate sensitivity displayed by FAR's projections during the post-1990 period would more closely approximate shorter-term transient climate sensitivity (TCR or TCS) discussed in section 2.2, as opposed to longer-term ECS. Such a result is consistent with other published studies showing TCS values of a little less or more than ~2°C [4; 109; 266, figure 1; 267; 571; 572; 577; 615; 647; 680], which falls near the middle of the IPCC's 2013 TCS range of 1°C - ~2.5°C [266, figure 1; 362, page 871 and figure 10.20 on page 925; 363, page 1108 and figure 12.45 on page 1109], as per section 2.7 of "Myth: Attributing Warming to CO2 Involves the Fallaciously Inferring Causation from a Mere Correlation". This, combined with the fact that the IPCC's FAR energy-budget-model-based approach likely under-estimates ECS, undermines objection 4's attempt to use IPCC FAR to argue for lower ECS.


Objection 5: Satellite-based trends remain more reliable than the surface analyses presented in section 2.1. These satellite-based trends conflict with the IPCC FAR forecast, yet section 2.1 illegitimately excludes these trends. So one should compare these trends to FAR's forecast [6; 12; 14; 15; 17, figures 1 and 6; 18, figure 4; 21; 22; 27; 114; 116; 496; 506; 548; 550; 551; 624; 626; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18].

Response 5: Satellite-based analyses of surface warming confirm surface trends from the instrumental records [147; 163; 383; 384; 672] discussed in section 2.1. So these satellite-based analyses further undermine the myth. Furthermore, the IPCC FAR scenarios focused on projected surface trends [5; 28, pages xi, xviii - xxiii, 190, and 331 - 336], as did myth proponents [1, from 1:08 - 4:40; 6 - 16; 17, figures 1, 2, and 6; 18, figure 4; 19 - 25; 26, page 5; 27; 32 - 36; 114; 116; 171; 254; 282; 283; 496; 506; 507; 509; 511; 512; 544; 546 - 548; 549, pages 396 - 398 and figure 12-7; 550; 551; 606; 612; 624; 626; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18; 690, pages 3, 8, and 9]. Yet some myth proponents refer [6; 12; 14; 15; 17, figures 1 and 6; 18, figure 4; 21; 22; 27; 114; 116; 496; 506; 548; 550; 551; 624; 626; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18] to satellite-based analyses from the University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAH) and Remote Sensing Systems (RSS), which are observational analyses of the bulk lower troposphere, not just the surface [126, pages S17 and S18; 385 - 387]. Comparing surface trends to bulk tropospheric trends would thus constitute an apples-to-oranges comparison, as admitted by UAH team member Roy Spencer [388]. So myth proponents mess up when they compare the IPCC's projected surface trends to RSS and/or UAH analyses [6; 12; 14; 15; 17, figures 1 and 6; 18, figure 4; 21; 22; 27; 114; 116; 496; 506; 548; 550; 551; 624; 626; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18].

The RSS and UAH lower tropospheric analyses suffer from their own problems. For instance, RSS and UAH are the only two oft-cited research groups generating satellite-based, lower tropospheric warming estimates [126, pages S17 and S18; 387, figure 8 on page 77] (there is a third group who's analysis shows much more warming than RSS and UAH [389], but that group is not cited much [126, pages S17 and S18; 387, figure 8 on page 77; 390]). This becomes problematic since the more research groups there are, the greater the chance that at least one group will identify any mistakes, as acknowledged in a report co-authored by UAH team member John Christy [391, pages 14, 42, 120, and 122]. In contrast to satellite-based lower tropospheric analyses, many more research groups generate surface analyses, as shown in section 2.1, offering a better chance for mistakes to be identified and corrected. 

The RSS and UAH lower tropospheric estimates also differ more from each other more than do surface estimates; moreover, these lower tropospheric estimates change by a fairly large amount between different versions of the RSS and UAH analyses, given the adjustments that come with each new version [385; 387; 392]. Consistent with this, RSS' Carl Mears notes that the satellite-based tropospheric temperature trend record comes with greater uncertainty than the surface temperature trend record [393, from 1:37 to 2:32; 394; 395] (based on his published uncertainty estimates [396; 397] and conference abstract [398]). The U.S. Global Change Research Program makes much the same point [184, Appendix A on pages 432 - 433], as does the climate scientist Andrew Dessler [399]. Myth proponents may select these more uncertain satellite-based estimates because they under-estimate recent warming.

The current RSS and UAH analyses under-estimate lower tropospheric warming, as admitted by the RSS team [126, page S17; 385, page 7715; 398] and shown by comparisons to other data sources [126, page S17; 398; 400, figure 10]. UAH does so to a larger extent, especially after UAH recently adjusted their analysis in a way that reduced their warming trend over the past couple of decades [401, figure 7], consistent with the following:
  1. UAH has a long history of under-estimating tropospheric warming due to UAH's data adjustment methods [305, from 36:31 to 37:10; 386; 387; 392; 399; 402; 403, pages 5 and 6; 404 - 409].
  2. Other scientists have critiqued UAH's adjustment methods [386; 387; 392; 399; 402; 404 - 418; 419, pages 17 - 19].
  3. UAH's satellite-based temperature analyses often diverge from analyses made by other research groups, in both the mid- to upper troposphere and other atmospheric layers [126, pages S17 and S18; 386; 387; 402; 407 - 417; 419, pages 17 - 19; 420 - 422].
I discuss these issues more in section 2.3 of "Myth: Santer et al. Show that Climate Models are Very Flawed". But I will give one example below to illustrate the UAH team's long history of distortions.

Satellite-based tropospheric analyses require a diurnal drift correction to account for the fact that satellite measurements occur at different times of day [184; 386; 392; 399; 413; 416; 423]. Since temperature at noon will likely be warmer than temperature at midnight, correcting for this time-of-day effects remains crucial for discovering any underlying tropospheric warming trends. The RSS team revealed that UAH bungled the diurnal drift adjustment in a way that spuriously reduced UAH's tropospheric warming trend [386; 392; 399]. According to UAH team members Roy Spencer and John Christy, correcting the UAH team's error increased UAH's lower tropospheric warming trend by ~40% [392]. RSS' own warming trend was even larger than this [386].

The UAH team's distortion occurred because the UAH team falsely assumed that the lower troposphere warmed at midnight and cooled at mid-day [392]. When the UAH team admitted this error, RSS team-members Carl Mears and Frank Wentz offered the following priceless reply [392; 424] (highlighting added):


So the UAH team under-estimated warming. RSS has done so as well [385; 416; 425], though their errors were not as obvious or egregious as UAH's. Yet the myth defender Christopher Monckton still cherry-picks [1, from 1:08 - 4:40; 17, figure 6] RSS's older, flawed analysis [385] in order under-estimate warming in comparison to FAR's projection. Figure 7 below depicts UAH's and RSS' lower tropospheric temperature trend for their current analyses, in comparison to other data sources, revealing how RSS and UAH likely under-estimate warming over the past two decades:

Figure 7: Global lower tropospheric relative temperature up to 2018, as estimated by various re-analyses that include data from diverse sources, radiosonde-based (weather-balloon-based) analyses, and satellite-based analyses. The colored lines indicate temperature relative to a baseline of 1981 - 2010 [126, figure 2.6 on page S17]. The satellite-based analyses likely under-estimate lower tropospheric warming [59, table 2.3 on page S18; 400, figure 10] over the past two decades, as admitted by the RSS satellite-based team [126, page S17; 385, page 7715; 398]. I discuss this further in section 2.2 of "Myth: Evidence Supports Curry's Claims Regarding Satellite-based Analyses and the Hot Spot". ERA5 is the update to ERA-I [119 - 123; 126, pages S18 - S19]; ERA-I under-estimates middle and lower tropospheric warming, as admitted by the ERA-I team [149, section 9; 426] and other researchers [328, section 2].

Myth proponents could hardly object to this comparison, since even UAH's Roy Spencer recommends comparing satellite-based analyses to the other sources shown in figure 7, in order to see whether satellite-based analyses under-estimate warming [137; 692]. Such a comparison shows the UAH analysis to be the low outlier for both the post-1979 period [126, table 2.3 on page S18; 400] and the past couple of decades [126, figure 2.6 on page S17; 398]. So the myth advocate David Evans is wrong when he says that the UAH analysis is more credible than instrumental surface analyses [12; 116], especially in light of UAH's aforementioned history of dubious temperature analyses [305, from 36:31 to 37:10; 386; 387; 392; 399; 402; 403, pages 5 and 6; 404 - 409], RSS admitting [126, page S17; 385, page 7715; 398] to under-estimating lower tropospheric warming [126, page S17; 398; 400, figure 10], RSS' Mears [393, from 1:37 to 2:32; 394; 395] and others [184, Appendix A on pages 432 - 433; 399] admitting these satellite-based analyses remain more uncertain than surface trends, the satellite-based analyses conflicting with other data sources [126, page S17; 398; 400, figure 10], as per figure 7, etc. I discuss this more in section 2.1 of "Myth: Evidence Supports Curry's Claims Regarding Satellite-based Analyses and the Hot Spot".

Despite these points, it would still be worthwhile to examine RSS' and UAH's trends, since myth proponents [6; 12; 14; 15; 17, figures 1 and 6; 18, figure 4; 21; 22; 27; 114; 116; 496; 506; 548; 550; 551; 624; 626; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18] such as Evans [12; 116; 624; 626] and Javier [6] cite them. The 1990 - 2019 satellite-based, lower tropospheric warming trends are, with +/- 2σ statistical uncertainty (in °C/decade):
  • RSSv4 [385]   :   0.23  +/-  0.09  [256; 427; 428]
  • UAHv6 [401]   :   0.13  +/-  0.09  [256; 429]
  • Average   :   0.18 [256; 427 - 429]

As previously discussed, comparing these bulk tropospheric trends to FAR's scenario B surface trends would constitute an apples-to-oranges comparison [388]. But even if one follows myth proponents in offering such a misleading comparison [6; 12; 14; 15; 17, figures 1 and 6; 18, figure 4; 21; 22; 27; 114; 116; 496; 506; 548; 550; 551; 624; 626; 654, from 3:06 to 5:18], the RSS analysis remains consistent with scenario B's projected trend, despite the fact that the RSS team admits to under-estimating recent warming [126, page S17; 385, page 7715; 398]. Even if one takes the average of UAH and RSS, in accordance with the recommendation of UAH's John Christy [430; 431], then that average still does not significantly differ from scenario B's trend of ~0.2°C/decade [28, page xxii, figure 9 on page xxiii, and figure A.9 on page 336], despite the fact that UAH greatly under-estimates warming [126, page S17; 385, page 7715; 398; 400, figure 10] (see figure 7) and has a decades-long history of doing so [305, from 36:31 to 37:10; 386; 387; 392; 399; 402; 403, pages 5 and 6; 404 - 409]. Thus, unless one cherry-picks the dubious UAH analysis, the satellite-based bulk tropospheric analyses fail to support the myth. Yet the myth proponent Evans still cherry-picks the UAH analysis anyway [12; 116], lauding it to the point of making up nonsense about it; this includes Evans [12] falsely [401] insinuating that the UAH team does not adjust past data.

(As a side-note for those who still feel tempted to cite CFSR, as per section 2.1: CFSR shows unusually large tropical upper tropospheric warming [166, figure 4; 432, figure 1; 433, generated using 434, as per 435; 576]. That contradicts the myth advocate Evans' attempts to cast doubt on the tropical troposopheric hot spot's existence [141; 381], as I discuss in "Myth: The Tropospheric Hot Spot does not Exist". So citing CFSR to salvage Evan's myths on the IPCC's surface trend projections [12; 13; 116] will end up undermining Evans' claims on tropical bulk tropospheric trends [141; 381].)


Objection 6: Surface temperature trend analyses are fake, and thus cannot be used to confirm the IPCC's forecasts.

Response 6: Even climate contrarians/denialists endorse many of the surface temperature analyses, as covered in section 2.1. Moreover, recent global warming occurred not only in surface temperatures records, but was also reflected in deep ocean warming, bulk atmospheric (tropospheric) trends from satellite-based analyses and weather balloons, ice melt, sea level rise acceleration, etc., as shown in "Myth: No Global Warming for Two Decades". One would need to be pretty deluded and hopelessly paranoid to claim scientists faked all these signs of warming; many contrarians/denialists display this sort of conspiracist ideation when it comes to climate science [436 - 445; 494; 669]. That sort of reasoning would run afoul of the flaws discussed in section 3.1 of "John Christy, Climate Models, and Long-term Tropospheric Warming", including the reasoning:
  • illegitimately evading falsification by fabricating an evidence-free, paranoid conspiracy theory in order to avoid any inconvenient evidence
  • resorting to cascade logic, in which an implausibly large number of people need to be involved in the conspiracy to fake data showing warming
  • engaging in special pleading, by applying a double-standard in which the objection's proponents (for no good reason) treat evidence in climate science differently from evidence in other scientific fields


Supplementary Section 2.1: Comparing Observed Greenhouse Gas Levels to the IPCC's 1990 Projections


This section compares observed post-1990 greenhouse gas increases with the increases projected in the IPCC's 1990 FAR scenarios. These comparisons will also show radiative forcing, which was discussed in section 2.2. In comparison to FAR's projected greenhouse gas increases [28, figure 5 on page xix and figure A.3 on page 333], observed greenhouse gas increases were as follows:
  • CO2 [65, figure 9 on page 2078; 115, figure 1.5 on page 132; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.1 on page 167; 364; 671], N2O [65, figure 12 on page 2085; 115, figure 1.7 on page 133; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.3 on page 168; 366; 671]   :   roughly half-way between BaU and B [115, figure 1.5 on page 132 and figure 1.7 on page 133; 117, figure 2; 183, pages 167 and 168]
  • CH4   :   roughly scenario D [65, figure 11 on page 2083; 115, figure 1.6 on page 133; 117; 183, figure 2.2 on page 167; 365; 671]
  • CFC-11 [65, figure S2; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.4 on page 168; 367; 671], CFC-12 [65, figure S3; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.4 on page 168; 368; 671], HCFC-22 [65, figure S15; 117, figure 2; 183, figure 2.4 on page 168; 369; 671]   :   less than scenario D



Figure 8: (Top panel) Projected CO2 increase for the IPCC First Assessment Report's four scenarios from 1985 to 2100 [28, figure 5 on page xix and figure A.3 on page 333]. (Bottom panel) Observed CO2 increase from 1950 - 2014 from various data sources.
"Raw station data" acronyms represent individual sites at which data was collected.
Acronyms: AQUA, Aqua satellite; ctrl, control runs of the model; CMIP5 models from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5; hist, historical runs of the models using past data; lat, latitude; GM, global monthly; MBL, marine boundary layer; NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; NH, northern hemisphere; NOAA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; ppm(v), parts per million (by volume); SH, southern hemisphere; WDCGG, World Data Centre for Greenhouse Gases [65, figure 9 on page 2078].

CO2 levels reached ~409ppm in 2018 [117; 364; 671].



Figure 9: (Top panel) Projected CH4 increase for the IPCC First Assessment Report's four scenarios from 1985 to 2100 [28, figure 5 on page xix and figure A.3 on page 333]. (Bottom panel) Observed CH4 increase from 1950 - 2014 from various data sources.
"Raw station data" acronyms represent individual sites at which data was collected.
Acronyms: ctrl, control runs of the model; CMIP5 models from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5; hist, historical runs of the models using past data; lat, latitude; MBL, marine boundary layer; NH, northern hemisphere; NOAA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; ppb(v), parts per billion (by volume); SH, southern hemisphere; WDCGG, World Data Centre for Greenhouse Gases [65, figure 11 on page 2083].

CH4 levels reached ~1860ppb in 2018 [117; 365; 671].



Figure 10: (Top panel) Projected N2O increase for the IPCC First Assessment Report's four scenarios from 1985 to 2100 [28, figure A.3 on page 333]. (Bottom panel) Observed N2O increase from 1950 - 2014 from various data sources.
"Raw station data" acronyms represent individual sites at which data was collected.
Acronyms: ctrl, control runs of the model; CMIP5 models from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5; hist, historical runs of the models using past data; lat, latitude; NH, northern hemisphere; ppb(v), parts per billion (by volume); SH, southern hemisphere; WDCGG, World Data Centre for Greenhouse Gases [65, figure 12 on page 2085].

N2O levels reached ~331ppb in 2018 [117; 366; 671].



Figure 11: (Top panel) Projected CFC-11 increase for the IPCC First Assessment Report's four scenarios from 1985 to 2100 [28, figure 5 on page xix and figure A.3 on page 333]. (Bottom panel) Observed CFC-11 increase from 1950 - 2014 from various data sources.
"Raw station data" acronyms represent individual sites at which data was collected.
Acronyms: lat, latitude; NH, northern hemisphere; NOAA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; ppt, parts per trillion; ODS, ozone-depleting substance; ppt(v), parts per trillion (by volume); SH, southern hemisphere; WMO, World Meteorological Organization [65, figure S2].

CFC-11 levels reached ~230ppt in 2018 [117; 367; 671].



Figure 12: (Top panel) Projected CFC-12 increase for the IPCC First Assessment Report's four scenarios from 1985 to 2100 [28, figure A.3 on page 333]. (Bottom panel) Observed CFC-12 increase from 1950 - 2014 from various data sources.
"Raw station data" acronyms represent individual sites at which data was collected.
Acronyms: lat, latitude; NH, northern hemisphere; NOAA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; ppt, parts per trillion; ODS, ozone-depleting substance; ppt(v), parts per trillion (by volume); SH, southern hemisphere; WMO, World Meteorological Organization [65, figure S3].

CFC-12 levels reached ~510ppt in 2018 [117; 368; 671].



Figure 13: (Top panel) Projected HCFC-22 increase for the IPCC First Assessment Report's four scenarios from 1985 to 2100 [28, figure A.3 on page 333]. (Bottom panel) Observed HCFC-22 increase from 1950 - 2014 from various data sources.
"Raw station data" acronyms represent individual sites at which data was collected.
Acronyms: AGAGE, Advanced Global Atmospheric Gases Experiment; lat, latitude; NH, northern hemisphere; NOAA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; ppt(v), parts per trillion (by volume); ODS, ozone-depleting substance; SH, southern hemisphere; WMO, World Meteorological Organization [65, figure S15].

HCFC-22 levels reached ~240ppt in 2018 [117; 369; 671].




3. Posts Providing Further Information and Analysis





4. References


  1. Youtube, potholer54's video: "Response to "The Global Warming Hoax Lord Monckton & Stefan Molyneux""
  2. Youtube, Your Waifu is a Whore's video: "Interview from the Culture Wars #15: potholer54 (Mirror)"
  3. https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-how-well-have-climate-models-projected-global-warming [http://archive.is/cvzpT#selection-9767.0-10611.349]
  4. "Evaluating the performance of past climate model projections" (Supplemental figures: https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/downloadSupplement?doi=10.1029%2F2019GL085378&file=grl59922-sup-0001-2019GL085378-SI.docx ; American Geophysical Union, December 2018 conference abstract: "Assessing the performance of historical climate model forecasts")
  5. "Assessment of the first consensus prediction on climate change"
  6. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2017/10/30/some-failed-climate-predictions/ [http://archive.vn/O52h9#selection-523.0-615.1]
  7. https://judithcurry.com/2018/12/15/week-in-review-science-edition-91/#comment-886645 [http://archive.is/8pED3#selection-9553.0-9581.121]
  8. https://judithcurry.com/2018/12/15/week-in-review-science-edition-91/#comment-886682 [http://archive.is/uVN0u#selection-10293.0-10349.415]
  9. https://judithcurry.com/2018/12/15/week-in-review-science-edition-91/#comment-886691 [http://archive.is/z8i4N#selection-10305.0-10331.168]
  10. https://judithcurry.com/2018/12/15/week-in-review-science-edition-91/#comment-886692 [http://archive.is/ZLDt9#selection-10419.0-10449.370]
  11. https://judithcurry.com/2018/12/15/week-in-review-science-edition-91/#comment-886736 [http://archive.is/CdC6b#selection-10623.0-10653.78]
  12. https://sciencespeak.com/climate-bet.html [http://archive.is/0Ggbm#selection-535.0-544.2]
  13. http://joannenova.com.au/2012/05/the-ipcc-1990-far-predictions-were-wrong/ [http://archive.is/yCTgH]
  14. http://clivebest.com/blog/?p=2208 [http://archive.is/CEXmV]
  15. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/06/09/comparing-ipcc-1990-predictions-with-2011-data/ [http://archive.is/BKSiM]
  16. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2018/08/15/climatologys-startling-error-of-physics-answers-to-comments/ [http://archive.is/vD3cG#selection-1053.0-1067.82]
  17. "Why models run hot: results from an irreducibly simple climate model"
  18. "Keeping it simple: the value of an irreducibly simple climate model"
  19. http://euanmearns.com/the-temperature-forecasting-record-of-the-ipcc/ [http://archive.is/Wjnsi {https://wattsupwiththat.com/2014/06/12/the-temperature-forecasting-track-record-of-the-ipcc/http://archive.is/ft11I}]
  20. http://rogerpielkejr.blogspot.com/2013/09/global-temperature-trends-and-ipcc.html [http://archive.is/sAlRB]
  21. Roger A. Pielke Jr., 2008: "Climate predictions and observations" [https://web.archive.org/web/20191005080227/https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/resource-2592-2008.07.pdf]
  22. https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/press-release-heartland-institute-applauds-nstas-demand-for-evidence-based-climate-science [https://web.archive.org/web/20191005080555/https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/press-release-heartland-institute-applauds-nstas-demand-for-evidence-based-climate-science]
  23. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203646004577213244084429540 ("Concerned scientists reply on global warming")
  24. https://bbickmore.wordpress.com/2012/02/22/response-to-wall-street-journal-16/ [http://archive.is/3UavY]
  25. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1166141537513857024 [http://archive.is/ekMCU#selection-603.1-632.1]
  26. http://www.kestencgreen.com/gas-2009-validity.pdf ["Validity of climate change forecasting for public policy decision making"; https://web.archive.org/web/20191005081412/http://www.kestencgreen.com/gas-2009-validity.pdf]
  27. https://www.c3headlines.com/2014/04/those-stubborn-facts-999-proof-that-ipcc-expert-climate-models-are-hugely-wrong-the-science-is-indis.html
  28. "Climate change: The IPCC scientific assessment" [https://web.archive.org/web/20191013204337/https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ipcc_far_wg_I_full_report.pdf]
  29. https://climatefeedback.org/claimreview/the-earth-was-not-warmer-in-medieval-times-town-hall-gregory-rummo/ (http://archive.is/Aw2Dd#selection-706.1-723.18)
  30. https://www.unibe.ch/news/media_news/media_relations_e/media_releases/2019/medienmitteilungen_2019/the_climate_is_warming_faster_than_it_has_in_the_last_2000_years/index_eng.html [http://archive.is/qQmsC#selection-831.0-879.99 ; image: https://www.unibe.ch/e796/e803/e59463/e805/e751801/e753172/e847220/media_service847225/e847266/20190719_MediaReleaseUniBE_Global_Warming_Graphic1_EN_eng.jpg [http://archive.is/w5dPj])
  31. "Consistent multidecadal variability in global temperature reconstructions and simulations over the Common Era" [figure 4a: http://archive.is/GrGsP]
  32. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2013/10/10/animated-analysis-shows-that-ipcc-ar5-global-warming-prediction-is-lower-than-ar4-tar-and-far/ [http://archive.is/9LVVy]
  33. https://blog.hotwhopper.com/2013/10/where-is-cooling-ira-glickstein-its.html
  34. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/12/19/an-animated-analysis-of-the-ipcc-ar5-graph-shows-ipcc-analysis-methodology-and-computer-models-are-seriously-flawed/ [https://web.archive.org/save/https://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/12/19/an-animated-analysis-of-the-ipcc-ar5-graph-shows-ipcc-analysis-methodology-and-computer-models-are-seriously-flawed/]
  35. https://www.thegwpf.com/ira-glickstein-ipcc-global-warming-predictions-seriously-flawed/ [http://archive.is/Ocduq]
  36. http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.nl/2014/03/have-past-ipcc-temperature.html [http://archive.is/oSD0g]
  37. Youtube, AGU's video: "AGU Chapman Conference -- Climate Science: Richard Alley" [AGU Chapman Conference on Communicating Climate Science: A Historic Look to the Future; 08 June 2013 — 13 June 2013, Granby, CO, USA; Presenter: Richard Alley; Abstract Title: State of the Climate System]
  38. "Climate change skepticism and denial: An introduction"
  39. "Reexamining climate change debates: Scientific disagreement or scientific certainty argumentation methods (SCAMs)?"
  40. "Climate change prediction: Erring on the side of least drama?"
  41. "Global warming estimates, media expectations, and the asymmetry of scientific challenge"
  42. "Comparing climate projections to observations up to 2011"
  43. "Comparison of dryland climate change in observations and CMIP5 simulations"
  44. "Accelerated dryland expansion under climate change"
  45. "The Copenhagen diagnosis: updating the world on the latest climate science"
  46. "Climate change drives widespread and rapid thermokarst development in very cold permafrost in the Canadian High Arctic"
  47. "Drivers and mechanisms of ocean deoxygenation"
  48. "Twentieth century temperature trends in CMIP3, CMIP5, and CESM-LE climate simulations: Spatial-temporal uncertainties, differences, and their potential sources"
  49. "Recent climate observations compared to projections"
  50. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-ipcc-underestimated-climate-change/
  51. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/climate-science-predictions-prove-too-conservative/
  52. http://www.climatecentral.org/news/report-ipcc-underestimate-assessing-climate-risks-15338
  53. https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-how-global-warming-is-causing-ocean-oxygen-levels-to-fall [http://archive.is/6siTa]
  54. "The language of denial: Text analysis reveals differences in language use between climate change proponents and skeptics
  55. "Statistical language backs conservatism in climate-change assessments
  56. "No time for smokescreen skepticism: A rejoinder to Shani and Arad
  57. "Comment on “Climate Science and the Uncertainty Monster” by J. A. Curry and P. J. Webster
  58. "Guidance note for lead authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on consistent treatment of uncertainties
  59. "Climate change 2013: The physical science basis; Chapter 11: Near-term climate change: projections and Predictability"
  60. "Climate change 2007: Synthesis Report; Summary for policymakers"
  61. "Climate change 2007: The physical science basis; Chapter 10: Global climate projections"
  62. "Climate change 2001: Synthesis report"
  63. "Climate change 2001: The scientific basis; Chapter 9: Projections of future climate change"
  64. "Climate change 1995: The science of climate change; Technical summary"
  65. "Historical greenhouse gas concentrations for climate modelling (CMIP6)"
  66. https://cdiac.ess-dive.lbl.gov/trends/emis/glo_2014.html [http://archive.is/m80DJ]
  67. "The growing role of methane in anthropogenic climate change"
  68. "Trends in global CO2 and total greenhouse gas emissions" [https://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/pbl-2018-trends-in-global-co2-and-total-greenhouse-gas-emissons-2018-report_3125.pdf]
  69. "The global methane budget 2000–2012"
  70. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1073811906769682433 [http://archive.is/vMkHV#selection-303.1-344.1]
  71. http://ohbwaa.blogspot.com/2018/11/climate-bets-evans-vs-schmidt.html [http://archive.is/VRCYn]
  72. http://rabett.blogspot.com/2018/01/climate-betting-update-dog-bites-man.html [http://archive.is/JaGAd]
  73. http://backseatdriving.blogspot.com/2007/04/new-global-warming-bet-for-7-10.html [http://archive.is/TarW]
  74. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1097136868372725763 [http://archive.is/xgcAB#selection-230.1-631.26]
  75. http://clivebest.com/blog/?p=2295 [http://archive.is/sXJq2#selection-317.160-317.312]
  76. https://mobile.twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1073703570380374024 [http://archive.is/otHC4#selection-230.1-1180.0]
  77. https://moyhu.blogspot.com/2018/02/weirdness-from-armstronggreen-and.html [http://archive.is/aTk0X]
  78. https://blog.hotwhopper.com/2018/02/the-spectacular-failure-of-2007-climate.html [http://archive.is/NlkCZ]
  79. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1070772165409193984 [http://archive.is/bE2qo#selection-230.1-340.1]
  80. https://blog.hotwhopper.com/2013/10/where-is-cooling-ira-glickstein-its.html [http://archive.is/cYE2l]
  81. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1102310310675968000 [http://archive.is/jeC6v#selection-362.1-477.7]
  82. https://judithcurry.com/2019/02/08/sea-level-rise-whiplash/#comment-889954 [http://archive.is/zpTPw#selection-2667.0-2813.17 ; https://web.archive.org/web/20190303204418/https://judithcurry.com/2019/02/08/sea-level-rise-whiplash/]
  83. "Global warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty" [https://web.archive.org/web/20191015031452/https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf]
  84. "Climate change 2007: Working Group I: The physical science basis; Annex I: Glossary"
  85. "“Prediction” or “Projection”? The nomenclature of climate science"
  86. "Climate change 2014: Working Group I: The physical science basis; Annex II: Glossary"
  87. "The ozone story: A model for addressing climate change?"
  88. "Depletion of the ozone layer in the 21st Century"
  89. "The Antarctic ozone hole: An update"
  90. "Antarctic ozone loss in 1979–2010: First sign of ozone recovery"
  91. "Quantifying the ozone and ultraviolet benefits already achieved by the Montreal Protocol"
  92. "Evidence for the effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer"
  93. "Emergence of healing in the Antarctic ozone layer"
  94. "Decline in Antarctic ozone depletion and lower stratospheric chlorine determined from Aura Microwave Limb Sounder observations"
  95. "Radiosondes show that after decades of cooling the lower stratosphere is now warming"
  96. "Middle atmosphere temperature trends in the 20th and 21st centuries simulated with the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model (WACCM)"
  97. "Stratospheric temperature trends: Our evolving understanding"
  98. "State of the climate in 2017"
  99. "Statistically derived contributions of diverse human influences to twentieth-century temperature changes"
  100. "Considerable contribution of the Montreal Protocol to declining greenhouse gas emissions from the United States"
  101. "The world avoided by the Montreal Protocol"
  102. "The importance of the Montreal Protocol in protecting climate"
  103. "Global atmospheric methane: budget, changes and dangers"
  104. "The role of carbon dioxide in climate forcing from 1979 to 2004: introduction of the Annual Greenhouse Gas Index"
  105. "Interpreting contemporary trends in atmospheric methane"
  106. "Climate change 2013: Working Group I: The physical science basis; Chapter 6; Carbon and other biogeochemical cycles"
  107. "Non-CO2 greenhouse gases and climate change" (DOI: 10.1038/nature10322)
  108. "Radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide: A significant revision of the methane radiative forcing"
  109. "A limited role for unforced internal variability in twentieth-century warming"
  110. https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why-natural-cycles-only-play-small-role-in-rate-of-global-warming [http://archive.is/SaRPi]
  111. "Estimating biases in sea surface temperature records using coastal weather stations"
  112. "The importance of unresolved biases in 20th century sea-surface temperature observations"
  113. https://skepticalscience.com/ipcc-overestimate-global-warming.htm [http://archive.is/50gAg]
  114. https://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/200807/monckton.cfm ["Climate sensitivity reconsidered" ; http://archive.is/Ke8h#selection-409.0-453.51]
  115. "Climate change 2013: Working Group I: The physical science basis; Chapter 1; Introduction"
  116. https://mises.org/library/skeptics-case [http://archive.is/MBelq#selection-1577.0-1627.124]
  117. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/aggi/aggi.html [http://archive.is/DKLix ; update to: "The role of carbon dioxide in climate forcing from 1979 to 2004: introduction of the Annual Greenhouse Gas Index"]
  118. "Climatology and interannual variability of dynamic variables in multiple reanalyses evaluated by the SPARC Reanalysis Intercomparison Project (S-RIP)"
  119. https://www.ecmwf.int/en/forecasts/datasets/reanalysis-datasets/era-interim [https://www.ecmwf.int/en/forecasts/datasets/reanalysis-datasets/era5]
  120. https://www.ecmwf.int/en/newsletter/159/meteorology/global-reanalysis-goodbye-era-interim-hello-era5
  121. https://confluence.ecmwf.int/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=74764925
  122. https://rda.ucar.edu/datasets/ds630.0/
  123. "ERA5 – a new reanalysis"
  124. https://twitter.com/RyanMaue/status/1158767762413670402 [http://archive.is/tAbpF#selection-169.1-173.208], in response to: https://wattsupwiththat.com/2019/08/02/july-2019-was-not-the-warmest-on-record/ (http://archive.is/9ckmV#selection-595.0-621.189)
  125. https://twitter.com/RyanMaue/status/1158565610860814338 [http://archive.is/zsZIh#selection-169.1-169.276]
  126. "State of the climate in 2018" (DOI: 10.1175/2019BAMSStateoftheClimate)
  127. https://judithcurry.com/2015/06/04/has-noaa-busted-the-pause-in-global-warming/#comment-708590 [http://archive.is/bCgx3#selection-6335.0-6335.238
  128. https://judithcurry.com/2015/11/06/hiatus-controversy-show-me-the-data/ [http://archive.is/bJ3va#selection-285.0-293.1]
  129. "Data or dogma? Promoting open inquiry in the debate over the magnitude of human impact on Earth’s climate. Hearing in front of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness, 8 December 2015" [http://archive.is/yC0ot#selection-759.7417-759.7617]
  130. https://judithcurry.com/2016/08/01/assessing-atmospheric-temperature-data-sets-for-climate-studies/ [http://archive.is/2jiVr#selection-381.0-421.176]
  131. "What do observational datasets say about modeled tropospheric temperature trends since 1979?"
  132. "U.S. House Committee on Science, Space & Technology, 29 Mar 2017, Testimony of John R. Christy"
  133. "At what cost? Examining the social cost of carbon"
  134. "State of the climate in 2016"
  135. "Examination of space-based bulk atmospheric temperatures used in climate research"
  136. Full Committee Hearing - "Climate Science: Assumptions, Policy Implications, and the Scientific Method" (Wednesday, March 29, 2017 - 10:00am) [https://science.house.gov/legislation/hearings/full-committee-hearing-climate-science-assumptions-policy-implications-and]
  137. http://www.drroyspencer.com/2016/03/comments-on-new-rss-v4-pause-busting-global-temperature-dataset/ [http://archive.is/TNIea#selection-241.0-281.660]
  138. https://pielkeclimatesci.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/r-278b.pdf
  139. "Comment on "Contributions of Anthropogenic and Natural Forcing to Recent Tropopause Height Changes""
  140. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2014/08/04/what-stratospheric-hotspot/
  141. http://joannenova.com.au/2012/05/models-get-the-core-assumptions-wrong-the-hot-spot-is-missing/
  142. http://joannenova.com.au/2015/11/new-science-17-solving-the-mystery-of-the-missing-hotspot/
  143. http://joannenova.com.au/2010/11/dessler-2010-how-to-call-vast-amounts-of-data-spurious/
  144. "Attribution of observed historical near-surface temperature variations to anthropogenic and natural causes using CMIP5 simulations"
  145. "Possible artifacts of data biases in the recent global surface warming hiatus" [supplemental material: https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/suppl/2015/06/03/science.aaa5632.DC1/Karl-SM.pdf , https://web.archive.org/web/20191010222248/https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/suppl/2015/06/03/science.aaa5632.DC1/Karl-SM.pdf]
  146. "Quantifying uncertainties in global and regional temperature change using an ensemble of observational estimates: The HadCRUT4 data set"
  147. "Recent global warming as confirmed by AIRS"
  148. "Coverage bias in the HadCRUT4 temperature series and its impact on recent temperature trends"
  149. "A reassessment of temperature variations and trends from global reanalyses and monthly surface climatological datasets"
  150. "The 'pause' in global warming in historical context: (II). Comparing models to observations"
  151. "Reconciling controversies about the ‘global warming hiatus’"
  152. "Recently amplified Arctic warming has contributed to a continual global warming trend"
  153. "A fluctuation in surface temperature in historical context: reassessment and retrospective on the evidence"
  154. "Geographical distribution of thermometers gives the appearance of lower historical global warming"
  155. "Coverage bias in the HadCRUT4 temperature series and its impact on recent temperature trends. UPDATE COBE-SST2 based land-ocean dataset"
  156. "Arctic warming in ERA-Interim and other analyses"
  157. "An investigation into the impact of using various techniques to estimate Arctic surface air temperature anomalies"
  158. "Statistical analysis of coverage error in simple global temperature estimators"
  159. "Contributions of atmospheric circulation variability and data coverage bias to the warming hiatus"
  160. "Continuously amplified warming in the Alaskan Arctic: Implications for estimating global warming hiatus"
  161. "Response to Gleisner et al (2015): Recent global warming hiatus dominated by low latitude temperature trends in surface and troposphere data" [A comment on: "Recent global warming hiatus dominated by low-latitude temperature trends in surface and troposphere data"]
  162. "Global temperature definition affects achievement of long-term climate goals"
  163. "A high-resolution 1983–2016 Tmax climate data record based on infrared temperatures and stations by the Climate Hazard Center"
  164. "Improvements in the GISTEMP uncertainty model" [DOI: 10.1029/2018JD029522]
  165. "Air temperature changes in the Arctic in the period 1951–2015 in the light of observational and reanalysis data"
  166. "Influence of tropical tropopause layer cooling on Atlantic hurricane activity"
  167. https://twitter.com/RyanMaue/status/1158826535358357505 [http://archive.is/jwltw#selection-289.1-310.1]
  168. https://climexp.knmi.nl/selectfield_rea.cgi?id=someone@somewhere [http://archive.is/CTHOI]
  169. https://www.iflscience.com/environment/major-climate-change-denial-think-tank-admits-using-false-data/
  170. https://mobile.twitter.com/ed_hawkins/status/897161233148915713 [http://archive.is/RRMb7 ; https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EJBrKIqW4AUSo84?format=png&name=900x900 (http://archive.is/HoO11)]
  171. https://johncarlosbaez.wordpress.com/2012/03/27/the-1990-ipcc-climate-projections/ [http://archive.is/HqAWF]
  172. "Global temperature change" [DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0606291103]
  173. "Skill and uncertainty in climate models" [DOI: 10.1002/wcc.58] 
  174. "Test of a decadal climate forecast"
  175. https://twitter.com/hausfath/status/1010240650967580672
  176. http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2018/06/30-years-after-hansens-testimony/
  177. http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2009/12/updates-to-model-data-comparisons/
  178. Unpublished manuscript: "Assessing climate model projections of anthropogenic warming patterns" [https://eartharxiv.org/ahq4p/download?format=pdf ; https://twitter.com/henrifdrake/status/1151226869720555522 (http://archive.is/Xb1Vq)]
  179. https://moyhu.blogspot.com/2018/06/hansens-1988-predictions-30-year.html
  180. https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2018/06/judgment-on-hansens-88-climate-testimony-he-was-right/
  181. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2018/jun/25/30-years-later-deniers-are-still-lying-about-hansens-amazing-global-warming-prediction
  182. https://climategraphs.wordpress.com/2017/11/06/evaluating-the-prediction-of-manabe-and-wetherald-1967/
  183. "Climate change 2013: The physical science basis; Chapter 2: Observations: Atmosphere and Surface"
  184. "Climate science special report: A sustained assessment activity of the U.S. Global Change Research Program"
  185. "Climate change impacts in the United States: The third national climate assessment"
  186. "A real-time Global Warming Index" [DOI: 10.1038/s41598-017-14828-5]
  187. "Causes of irregularities in trends of global mean surface temperature since the late 19th century"
  188. "Causes of climate change over the historical record"
  189. "Assessing the observed impact of anthropogenic climate change"
  190. "On the causal structure between CO2 and global temperature"
  191. "A contribution to attribution of recent global warming by out-of-sample Granger causality analysis"
  192. "Testing for linear Granger causality from natural/anthropogenic forcings to global temperature anomalies"
  193. "Anthropogenic and natural causes of climate change"
  194. "Return periods of global climate fluctuations and the pause"
  195. "Scaling fluctuation analysis and statistical hypothesis testing of anthropogenic warming"
  196. "Identifying human influences on atmospheric temperature"
  197. "Anthropogenic and natural warming inferred from changes in Earth’s energy balance"
  198. "Detection and attribution of climate change: a regional perspective"
  199. "Combinations of natural and anthropogenic forcings in twentieth-century climate"
  200. "A multimodel update on the detection and attribution of global surface warming"
  201. "Solar trends and global warming"
  202. "Small influence of solar variability on climate over the past millennium"
  203. "Evidence of recent causal decoupling between solar radiation and global temperature"
  204. "The detection and attribution of climate change using an ensemble of opportunity"
  205. "Estimation of natural and anthropogenic contributions to twentieth century temperature change"
  206. "Attributing observed SST trends and subcontinental land warming to anthropogenic forcing during 1979–2005"
  207. "Sensitivity of the attribution of near surface temperature warming to the choice of observational dataset"
  208. "A probabilistic quantification of the anthropogenic component of twentieth century global warming"
  209. "Quantifying anthropogenic influence on recent near-surface temperature change"
  210. "Evidence for external forcing on 20th-century climate from combined ocean-atmosphere warming patterns"
  211. "Observed 21st century temperatures further constrain likely rates of future warming"
  212. "CMIP5 historical simulations (1850–2012) with GISS ModelE2"
  213. "Climate variability and change since 850 C.E.: An ensemble approach with the Community Earth System Model (CESM)"
  214. "Uncertainties in the attribution of greenhouse gas warming and implications for climate prediction"
  215. "Application of regularised optimal fingerprinting to attribution. Part II: application to global near-surface temperature"
  216. "A fractal climate response function can simulate global average temperature trends of the modern era and the past millennium"
  217. "Evaluating global climate responses to different forcings using simple indices"
  218. "Causes of twentieth-century temperature change near the Earth’s surface"
  219. "Causes of climate change over the past 1000 years"
  220. "How natural and anthropogenic influences alter global and regional surface temperatures: 1889 to 2006"
  221. "Detecting climate signals in the surface temperature record"
  222. "Detecting the influence of fossil fuel and bio-fuel black carbon aerosols on near surface temperature changes"
  223. "Drivers of decadal hiatus periods in the 20th and 21st centuries"
  224. "Testing the robustness of the anthropogenic climate change detection statements using different empirical models"
  225. "A new statistical approach to climate change detection and attribution"
  226. "Improved constraints on 21st-century warming derived using 160 years of temperature observations"
  227. "Climate of the past millennium: combining proxy data and model simulations"
  228. "The role of Atlantic Multi-decadal Oscillation in the global mean temperature variability"
  229. "The Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation as a dominant factor of oceanic influence on climate"
  230. "Lower tropospheric temperatures 1978-2016: The role played by anthropogenic global warming"
  231. "Clarifying the roles of greenhouse gases and ENSO in recent global warming through their prediction performance"
  232. "Impact of global dimming and brightening on global warming"
  233. "A probabilistic analysis of human influence on recent record global mean temperature changes"
  234. "Do models underestimate the solar contribution to recent climate change?"
  235. "Statistical assessments of anthropogenic and natural global climate forcing. An update"
  236. "Contribution of Atlantic and Pacific multidecadal variability to twentieth-century temperature changes"
  237. "Global Warming (1970–Present)" [in "The Palgrave Handbook of Climate History", pages 321-328]
  238. "Testing for the possible influence of unknown climate forcings upon global temperature increases from 1950 to 2000"
  239. "New insights into natural variability and anthropogenic forcing of global/regional climate evolution"
  240. "The life and death of the recent global surface warming hiatus parsimoniously explained"
  241. "Detection of human influence on a new, validated 1500-year temperature reconstruction"
  242. "Process-based decomposition of the decadal climate difference between 2002–13 and 1984–95"
  243. "Consensus on consensus: a synthesis of consensus estimates on human-caused global warming"
  244. http://www.pewinternet.org/interactives/public-scientists-opinion-gap/
  245. "Models, manifestation and attribution of climate change"
  246. "The Bray and von Storch 5th International Survey of Climate Scientists 2015/2016"
  247. "Advancing the science of climate change (2010)"
  248. https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/
  249. AGU conference abstract: "The Berkeley Earth surface temperature averaging methodology"
  250. "Berkeley Earth temperature averaging process" [DOI: 10.4172/gigs.1000103]
  251. https://judithcurry.com/2011/10/20/berkeley-surface-temperatures-released/ [http://archive.is/LfWEn#selection-293.0-293.102]
  252. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2015/06/04/noaancdcs-new-pause-buster-paper-a-laughable-attempt-to-create-warming-by-adjusting-past-data/ [http://archive.is/hw88D#selection-1203.134-1203.236]
  253. https://judithcurry.com/2019/10/16/climate-limits-and-timelines/#comment-901525 ["Early predictions of warming were 0.2 to 0.3 degrees Centigrade per decade are too high relative actual observations. [...] Define ‘early’. My definition of ‘early’ does not include 2018. Try FAR, SAR, TAR, AR4" ; http://archive.is/TK5ys#selection-4385.0-4385.86]
  254. https://judithcurry.com/2019/10/16/climate-limits-and-timelines/#comment-901492 [http://archive.is/9m7eD#selection-1117.0-1157.198]
  255. https://judithcurry.com/2019/10/16/climate-limits-and-timelines/#comment-901531 [http://archive.is/KXu9H#selection-3321.0-3351.79]
  256. http://www.ysbl.york.ac.uk/~cowtan/applets/trend/trend.html
  257. http://berkeleyearth.org/land-and-ocean-data/
  258. https://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/
  259. https://climexp.knmi.nl/data/igiss_al_gl_m_a.txt [http://archive.is/TNJ6z]
  260. http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~kdc3/papers/coverage2013/series.html
  261. https://climexp.knmi.nl/data/ihad4sst4_krig_v2_0_0_gl_a.txt [http://archive.is/MNP54]
  262. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/monitoring-references/faq/anomalies.php#anomalies
  263. https://climexp.knmi.nl/data/incdc_gl_a.txt [http://archive.is/Z3IaJ]
  264. https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/hadobs/hadcrut4/data/current/download.html
  265. https://climexp.knmi.nl/data/ihadcrut4_ns_avg_++_a.txt [http://archive.is/m40eh]
  266. "Beyond equilibrium climate sensitivity"
  267. "Estimating the transient climate response from observed warming"
  268. "The utility of the historical record for assessing the transient climate response to cumulative emissions"
  269. "Climate sensitivity estimates–sensitivity to radiative forcing time series and observational data"
  270. "The transient response to cumulative CO2 emissions: A review"
  271. https://www.iep.utm.edu/prop-log/
  272. "Climate change 2013: Working Group I: The physical science basis; Chapter 8; Anthropogenic and natural radiative forcing"
  273. "Natural variability, radiative forcing and climate response in the recent hiatus reconciled"
  274. "Reconciling warming trends"
  275. "Historical tropospheric and stratospheric ozone radiative forcing using the CMIP6 database"
  276. "Isotopic constraint on the twentieth-century increase in tropospheric ozone"
  277. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1181936395830452224 [http://archive.is/B6IYK#selection-98.1-1056.2 ; https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1181951725525032962 (http://archive.is/GlNvm)]
  278. https://judithcurry.com/2019/10/16/climate-limits-and-timelines/#comment-901562 [http://archive.is/lpY8q#selection-2569.0-2609.142]
  279. http://archive.is/UXEX0 [http://archive.is/UXEX0#selection-2403.0-2483.172]
  280. https://fabiusmaximus.com/2015/09/24/scientists-restart-climate-change-debate-89635/ [http://archive.is/UGXZg#selection-1469.0-1483.312]
  281. https://fabiusmaximus.com/2019/10/01/confessions-of-a-climate-scientist/ [http://archive.is/XPizc#selection-669.2-669.282]
  282. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2019/10/15/climate-change-fake-news-global-threat-science/
  283. https://climatefeedback.org/evaluation/telegraph-article-misleads-with-false-balance-mixing-in-unsupported-and-inaccurate-claims-sarah-knapton/ [http://archive.is/4Usg3#selection-1121.0-1143.692]
  284. "Global warming: Understanding the forecast"
  285. https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/EnergyBalance/page7.php
  286. "Insights into Earth’s energy imbalance from multiple sources"
  287. "Reconciling estimates of ocean heating and Earth’s radiation budget"
  288. "Observed and simulated full-depth ocean heat-content changes for 1970–2005"
  289. "Earth's energy imbalance: Confirmation and implications"
  290. "The greenhouse theory of climate change: A test by an inadvertent global experiment"
  291. "Observational determination of surface radiative forcing by CO2 from 2000 to 2010" [followed up in the conference abstract: "Direct observations of the greenhouse effect of CO2 and CH4 over Greenland" ; http://archive.is/Scg6t]
  292. "Increases in greenhouse forcing inferred from the outgoing longwave radiation spectra of the Earth in 1970 and 1997" [updated in the unpublished: "Spectral signatures of climate change in the Earth’s infrared spectrum between 1970 and 2006" ; https://web.archive.org/web/20191019203356/https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ad77/baeca26c4f77a9d043a5b53e058ea959e495.pdf]
  293. "The spectral signature of recent climate change"
  294. "Radiative forcing - measured at Earth's surface - corroborate the increasing greenhouse effect"
  295. "A mental picture of the greenhouse effect: A pedagogic explanation"
  296. "The greenhouse effect and carbon dioxide" (DOI: 10.1002/wea.2072)
  297. "Observationally derived rise in methane surface forcing mediated by water vapour trends"
  298. "Attribution of the present-day total greenhouse effect"
  299. "Infrared radiation and planetary temperature"
  300. "Comparison of spectrally resolved outgoing longwave radiation over the tropical Pacific between 1970 and 2003 using IRIS, IMG, and AIRS"
  301. "Global atmospheric downward longwave radiation at the surface from ground-based observations, satellite retrievals, and reanalyses"
  302. "Infra-red absorption by carbon dioxide, with special reference to atmospheric radiation"
  303. "Infrared absorption by carbon dioxide, water vapor, and minor atmospheric constituents"
  304. "The infra-red spectra of atmospheric gases other than water vapour"
  305. Ray Pierrehumbert's 2012 video: "Tyndall Lecture: GC43I. Successful Predictions - 2012 AGU Fall Meeting"
  306. dessler2's (Andrew Dessler's) 2019 video: "climate sensitivity at Univ. of Utah"
  307. https://www.climate.gov/maps-data/primer/climate-forcing [http://archive.is/sYPSi]
  308. "Global warming due to increasing absorbed solar radiation"
  309. "Shortwave and longwave radiative contributions to global warming under increasing CO2"
  310. "Earth's outgoing longwave radiation linear due to H2O greenhouse effect"
  311. "Feedbacks, climate sensitivity and the limits of linear models"
  312. "The equilibrium sensitivity of the Earth’s temperature to radiation changes"
  313. "Variation in climate sensitivity and feedback parameters during the historical period"
  314. "How well do we understand and evaluate climate change feedback processes?"
  315. "Climate sensitivity in the geologic past"
  316. "Committed warming inferred from observations"
  317. "Palaeoclimate constraints on the impact of 2 °C anthropogenic warming and beyond"
  318. "Introduction to atmospheric chemistry" (by Daniel J. Jacob, Princeton University Press, 1999)
  319. "Encyclopedia of atmospheric sciences: Second edition" (by Gerald R. North, et al.; 2014)
  320. "Atmospheric CO2: Principal control knob governing Earth’s temperature"
  321. "The role of long-lived greenhouse gases as principal LW control knob that governs the global surface temperature for past and future climate change"
  322. https://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/climatescience/climatesciencenarratives/its-water-vapor-not-the-co2.html [http://archive.is/06KcJ]
  323. "Increased insolation threshold for runaway greenhouse processes on Earth like planets"
  324. "Observations of climate feedbacks over 2000–10 and comparisons to climate models"
  325. "Upper-tropospheric moistening in response to anthropogenic warming"
  326. "Anthropogenic greenhouse forcing and strong water vapor feedback increase temperature in Europe"
  327. "Global water vapor trend from 1988 to 2011 and its diurnal asymmetry based on GPS, radiosonde, and microwave satellite measurements"
  328. "Climate variability and relationships between top-of-atmosphere radiation and temperatures on Earth"
  329. "An assessment of tropospheric water vapor feedback using radiative kernels"
  330. "An analysis of tropospheric humidity trends from radiosondes"
  331. "An observationally based constraint on the water-vapor feedback"
  332. "Comparison of global observations and trends of total precipitable water derived from microwave radiometers and COSMIC radio occultation from 2006 to 2013"
  333. "Enhanced positive water vapor feedback associated with tropical deep convection: New evidence from Aura MLS"
  334. "Water-vapor climate feedback inferred from climate fluctuations, 2003–2008"
  335. "Stratospheric water vapor feedback" [DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1310344110]
  336. "A tight coupling between atmospheric pCO2 and sea-surface temperature in the Late Triassic"
  337. "Reconciled climate response estimates from climate models and the energy budget of Earth"
  338. "The influence of internal variability on Earth's energy balance framework and implications for estimating climate sensitivity"
  339. "The impact of recent forcing and ocean heat uptake data on estimates of climate sensitivity"
  340. "Impact of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) on deriving anthropogenic warming rates from the instrumental temperature record"
  341. "Implications for climate sensitivity from the response to individual forcings"
  342. "Implications of potentially lower climate sensitivity on climate projections and policy"
  343. "Disentangling greenhouse warming and aerosol cooling to reveal Earth’s climate sensitivity"
  344. "Inhomogeneous forcing and transient climate sensitivity"
  345. "On a minimal model for estimating climate sensitivity"
  346. "Corrigendum to "On a minimal model for estimating climate sensitivity" [Ecol. Model. 297 (2015), 20-25]"
  347. "Projection and prediction: Climate sensitivity on the rise"
  348. "Accounting for changing temperature patterns increases historical estimates of climate sensitivity"
  349. "Energy budget constraints on climate sensitivity in light of inconstant climate feedbacks"
  350. "Time-varying climate sensitivity from regional feedbacks"
  351. "Impact of decadal cloud variations on the Earth's energy budget"
  352. "An estimate of equilibrium climate sensitivity from interannual variability"
  353. "Inference of climate sensitivity from analysis of Earth's energy budget"
  354. "Nonlinear climate sensitivity and its implications for future greenhouse warming"
  355. "Estimating transient climate response in a large-ensemble global climate model simulation"
  356. "A refined model for the Earth’s global energy balance"
  357. "Slow climate mode reconciles historical and model-based estimates of climate sensitivity"
  358. "Internal variability and disequilibrium confound estimates of climate sensitivity from observations"
  359. "On the time evolution of climate sensitivity and future warming"
  360. "Misdiagnosis of Earth climate sensitivity based on energy balance model results"
  361. "Evaluating climate sensitivity to CO2 across Earth’s history"
  362. "Climate change 2013: Working Group I: The physical science basis; Chapter 10; Detection and attribution of climate change: from global to regional"
  363. "Climate change 2013: Working Group I: The physical science basis; Chapter 12; Long-term climate change: Projections, commitments and irreversibility"
  364. https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/ [http://archive.is/WWXGK]
  365. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends_ch4/ [http://archive.is/47WpL]
  366. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends_n2o/ [http://archive.is/tpSJ4]
  367. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/hats/combined/CFC11.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20191021064601/https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/hats/combined/CFC11.html]
  368. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/hats/combined/CFC12.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20191021064807/https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/hats/combined/CFC12.html]
  369. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/hats/gases/HCFC22.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20191021064633/https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/hats/gases/HCFC22.html]
  370. "Climate change 2001: The scientific basis; Chapter 6: Radiative forcing of climate change"
  371. "Global sea level linked to global temperature"
  372. "Temperature-driven global sea-level variability in the Common Era"
  373. "Climate-change–driven accelerated sea-level rise detected in the altimeter era"
  374. "Sea-level rise caused by climate change and its implications for society"
  375. "A data set of worldwide glacier fluctuations"
  376. https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/sea-level/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20191021085247/https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/sea-level/]
  377. "Observations of the rate and acceleration of global mean sea level change"
  378. "Global sea-level budget 1993–present" (DOI: 10.5194/essd-10-1551-2018)
  379. https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level [http://archive.is/N3APb]
  380. "The implications for climate sensitivity of AR5 forcing and heat uptake estimates"
  381. David Evans': "The Missing Hotspot" [https://web.archive.org/web/20191021202123/https://sciencespeak.com/MissingSignature.pdf]
  382. .http://joannenova.com.au/2015/11/new-science-18-finally-climate-sensitivity-calculated-at-just-one-tenth-of-official-estimates/ [http://archive.is/il1Bu]
  383. "Assessing recent warming using instrumentally homogeneous sea surface temperature records"
  384. "Assessing the impact of satellite-based observations in sea surface temperature trends"
  385. "A satellite-derived lower tropospheric atmospheric temperature dataset using an optimized adjustment for diurnal effects"
  386. "The effect of diurnal correction on satellite-derived lower tropospheric temperature"
  387. "Tropospheric temperature trends: history of an ongoing controversy"
  388. https://www.drroyspencer.com/2019/04/australia-surface-temperatures-compared-to-uah-satellite-data-over-the-last-40-years/ [http://archive.is/ZvzmI#selection-197.0-197.94]
  389. "30-year atmospheric temperature record derived by one-dimensional variational data assimilation of MSU/AMSU-A observations"
  390. https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C36&q=%2230-year+atmospheric+temperature+record+derived+by+one-dimensional+variational+data+assimilation+of+MSU%2FAMSU-A+observations%22&btnG= [http://archive.is/QxzUm#selection-843.0-845.10]
  391. "Temperature trends in the lower atmosphere: Steps for understanding and reconciling differences"
  392. "Correcting temperature data sets"
  393. Youtube: "Satellite Scientist: Surface Temp Measures are More Accurate"
  394. http://www.remss.com/blog/recent-slowing-rise-global-temperatures/ ("Measurement Errors" section; http://archive.is/BslvQ#selection-489.558-489.783)
  395. https://climatefeedback.org/evaluation/washington-examiner-op-ed-cherry-picks-data-to-mislead-readers-about-climate-models-patrick-michaels-caleb-stewart-rossiter/ (http://archive.is/b659Z#selection-643.0-643.311)
  396. "Assessing uncertainty in estimates of atmospheric temperature changes from MSU and AMSU using a Monte-Carlo estimation technique"
  397. "Assessing the value of Microwave Sounding Unit–radiosonde comparisons in ascertaining errors in climate data records of tropospheric temperatures"
  398. AGU conference abstract: "Understanding and reconciling differences in surface and satellite-based lower troposphere temperatures" [http://archive.is/YWfAV]
  399. Youtube: "Andrew Dessler on Satellite Temp Errors"
  400. "An analysis of the discontinuity in Chinese radiosonde temperature data using satellite observation as a reference"
  401. "UAH version 6 global satellite temperature products: Methodology and results" [http://archive.is/xRlj5]
  402. "The reproducibility of observational estimates of surface and atmospheric temperature change"
  403. "Review of the consensus and asymmetric quality of research on human-induced climate change"
  404. "Effects of orbital decay on satellite-derived lower-tropospheric temperature trends"
  405. "Spurious trends in satellite MSU temperatures from merging different satellite records"
  406. "Difficulties in obtaining reliable temperature trends: Reconciling the surface and satellite microwave sounding unit records"
  407. "Global warming deduced from MSU"
  408. "Comments on "Analysis of the merging procedure for the MSU daily temperature time series""
  409. "Global warming: Evidence from satellite observations"
  410. "Comparing tropospheric warming in climate models and satellite data"
  411. "Contribution of stratospheric cooling to satellite-inferred tropospheric temperature trends"
  412. "Satellite-derived vertical dependence of tropical tropospheric temperature trends"
  413. "Removing diurnal cycle contamination in satellite-derived tropospheric temperatures: understanding tropical tropospheric trend discrepancies"
  414. "A bias in the midtropospheric channel warm target factor on the NOAA-9 Microwave Sounding Unit"
  415. "Reply to “Comments on 'A bias in the midtropospheric channel warm target factor on the NOAA-9 Microwave Sounding Unit'"
  416. "Sensitivity of satellite-derived tropospheric temperature trends to the diurnal cycle adjustment"
  417. "A comparative analysis of data derived from orbiting MSU/AMSU instruments"
  418. "Evidence of possible sea-ice influence on Microwave Sounding Unit tropospheric temperature trends in polar regions"
  419. "Extended Summary of the Climate Dialogue on the (missing) tropical hot spot"
  420. "Stratospheric temperature changes during the satellite era"
  421. "Tropospheric warming over the past two decades"
  422. "Causes of differences in model and satellite tropospheric warming rates"
  423. "Effects of diurnal adjustment on biases and trends derived from inter-sensor calibrated AMSU-A data"
  424. https://twitter.com/AndrewDessler/status/1091119933285695489 [http://archive.is/CR4FP#selection-527.1-552.1]
  425. http://www.drroyspencer.com/2011/07/on-the-divergence-between-the-uah-and-rss-global-temperature-records/ [http://archive.is/Fa9R1#selection-327.0-341.32]
  426. "Estimating low-frequency variability and trends in atmospheric temperature using ERA-Interim"
  427. http://images.remss.com/msu/msu_time_series.html [http://images.remss.com/data/msu/graphics/TLT_v40/time_series/RSS_TS_channel_TLT_Global_Land_And_Sea_v04_0.txt ; http://archive.is/QADXz]
  428. https://climexp.knmi.nl/getindices.cgi?WMO=SSMIData/rss_tlt_gl&STATION=TLT&TYPE=i&id=someone@somewhere [https://climexp.knmi.nl/data/irss_tlt_gl_a.txt ; http://archive.is/h0zjX]
  429. https://climexp.knmi.nl/getindices.cgi?WMO=UAHData/tlt_gl&STATION=TLT&TYPE=i&id=someone@somewhere [https://climexp.knmi.nl/data/itlt_gl_a.txt ; http://archive.is/jNagZ]
  430. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2018/10/16/the-new-rss-tlt-data-is-unbelievable-or-would-that-be-better-said-not-believable-a-quick-introduction/#comment-2494185 [http://archive.is/SI5li#selection-8399.0-8399.1214]
  431. https://judithcurry.com/2018/07/03/the-hansen-forecasts-30-years-later/ [http://archive.is/uvF3i]
  432. "Impacts of atmospheric temperature trends on tropical cyclone activity"
  433. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/cgi-bin/data/testdap/timeseries.proc.pl?dataset1=NCEP%2FCFSR&dataset2=NCEP%2FCFSR&var=Air+Temperature&level=300mb&var2=2m+Air+Temperature&level2=1000mb&fyear=1979&fyear2=2017&season=0&fmonth=0&fmonth2=11&type=1&climo1yr1=1979&climo1yr2=2017&climo2yr1=1979&climo2yr2=2017&xlat1=-30&xlat2=30&xlon1=0&xlon2=360&maskx=0&zlat1=-30&zlat2=30&zlon1=0&zlon2=360&maskx2=0&map=0&yaxis=0&bar=0&smooth=0&runmean=1&yrange1=0&yrange2=0&y2range1=0&y2range2=0&xrange1=0&xrange2=0&markers=0&legend=0&Submit=Create+Plot [https://web.archive.org/web/20191022002257/https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/cgi-bin/data/testdap/timeseries.proc.pl?dataset1=NCEP%2FCFSR&dataset2=NCEP%2FCFSR&var=Air+Temperature&level=300mb&var2=2m+Air+Temperature&level2=1000mb&fyear=1979&fyear2=2017&season=0&fmonth=0&fmonth2=11&type=1&climo1yr1=1979&climo1yr2=2017&climo2yr1=1979&climo2yr2=2017&xlat1=-30&xlat2=30&xlon1=0&xlon2=360&maskx=0&zlat1=-30&zlat2=30&zlon1=0&zlon2=360&maskx2=0&map=0&yaxis=0&bar=0&smooth=0&runmean=1&yrange1=0&yrange2=0&y2range1=0&y2range2=0&xrange1=0&xrange2=0&markers=0&legend=0&Submit=Create+Plot]
  434. "Web-based Reanalysis Intercomparison Tool: Monthly/seasonal time series" https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/cgi-bin/data/testdap/timeseries.pl
  435. "Web-Based Reanalysis Intercomparison Tools (WRIT) for analysis and comparison of reanalyses and other datasets"
  436. "Denialism: what is it and how should scientists respond?"
  437. "How the growth of denialism undermines public health"
  438. "Science denialism: Evolution and climate change"
  439. "Manufactured scientific controversy: Science, rhetoric, and public debate"
  440. "The ethics of belief, cognition, and climate change pseudoskepticism: Implications for public discourse"
  441. "The conditional effect of conspiracy thinking on attitudes toward climate change"
  442. "Climate change conspiracy theories" [DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.013.328]
  443. "Science and the public: Debate, denial, and skepticism"
  444. "Climate and environmental science denial: A review of the scientific literature published in 1990–2015"
  445. "Relationships among conspiratorial beliefs, conservatism and climate scepticism across nations"
  446. "A new estimate of the average Earth surface land temperature spanning 1753 to 2011"
  447. "NOAA's merged land-ocean surface temperature analysis"
  448. "MERRA-2: Initial evaluation of the climate"
  449. https://gmao.gsfc.nasa.gov/reanalysis/MERRA-2/
  450. "The NCEP climate forecast system version 2"
  451. https://rda.ucar.edu/datasets/ds093.1/ [http://archive.is/KAtHp]
  452. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access/model-data/model-datasets/climate-forecast-system-version2-cfsv2
  453. "The NCEP climate forecast system reanalysis"
  454. "The JRA-55 reanalysis: Representation of atmospheric circulation and climate variability"
  455. "The JRA-55 reanalysis: General specifications and basic characteristics"
  456. "The Japanese 55-year reanalysis "JRA-55": an interim report"
  457. http://jra.kishou.go.jp/JRA-55/index_en.html
  458. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/cgi-bin/data/testdap/timeseries.proc.pl?dataset1=ERA-5&dataset2=JRA-55&var=2m+Air+Temperature&level=1000mb&pgT1Sel=10&pgtTitle1=&pgtPath1=&var2=2m+Air+Temperature&level2=1000mb&pgT2Sel=10&pgtTitle2=&pgtPath2=&fyear=1990&fyear2=2019&season=0&fmonth=0&fmonth2=11&type=1&climo1yr1=1990&climo1yr2=2019&climo2yr1=1990&climo2yr2=2019&xlat1=-90&xlat2=90&xlon1=0&xlon2=360&maskx=0&zlat1=-90&zlat2=90&zlon1=0&zlon2=360&maskx2=0&map=on&yaxis=0&bar=0&smooth=0&runmean=1&yrange1=0&yrange2=0&y2range1=0&y2range2=0&xrange1=0&xrange2=0&markers=0&legend=0&ywave1=&ywave2=&cwavelow=&cwavehigh=&cwaveint=&coi=0&Submit=Create+Plot [http://archive.is/Wu4QI]
  459. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/cgi-bin/data/testdap/timeseries.proc.pl?dataset1=NCEP%2FDOE+R2&dataset2=NCEP%2FNCAR+R1&var=2m+Air+Temperature&level=1000mb&pgT1Sel=10&pgtTitle1=&pgtPath1=&var2=2m+Air+Temperature&level2=1000mb&pgT2Sel=10&pgtTitle2=&pgtPath2=&fyear=1990&fyear2=2019&season=0&fmonth=0&fmonth2=11&type=1&climo1yr1=1990&climo1yr2=2019&climo2yr1=1990&climo2yr2=2019&xlat1=-90&xlat2=90&xlon1=0&xlon2=360&maskx=0&zlat1=-90&zlat2=90&zlon1=0&zlon2=360&maskx2=0&map=on&yaxis=0&bar=0&smooth=0&runmean=1&yrange1=0&yrange2=0&y2range1=0&y2range2=0&xrange1=0&xrange2=0&markers=0&legend=0&ywave1=&ywave2=&cwavelow=&cwavehigh=&cwaveint=&coi=0&Submit=Create+Plot [http://archive.is/36MxM]
  460. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/cgi-bin/data/testdap/timeseries.proc.pl?dataset1=MERRA-2&dataset2=NCEP%2FCFSR&var=2m+Air+Temperature&level=1000mb&pgT1Sel=10&pgtTitle1=&pgtPath1=&var2=2m+Air+Temperature&level2=1000mb&pgT2Sel=10&pgtTitle2=&pgtPath2=&fyear=1990&fyear2=2019&season=0&fmonth=0&fmonth2=11&type=1&climo1yr1=1990&climo1yr2=2019&climo2yr1=1990&climo2yr2=2019&xlat1=-90&xlat2=90&xlon1=0&xlon2=360&maskx=0&zlat1=-90&zlat2=90&zlon1=0&zlon2=360&maskx2=0&map=on&yaxis=0&bar=0&smooth=0&runmean=1&yrange1=0&yrange2=0&y2range1=0&y2range2=0&xrange1=0&xrange2=0&markers=0&legend=0&ywave1=&ywave2=&cwavelow=&cwavehigh=&cwaveint=&coi=0&Submit=Create+Plot [http://archive.is/gVrKs]
  461. https://climexp.knmi.nl/getindices.cgi?WMO=ERA5/era5_t2m_gl&STATION=ERA_global_t2m&TYPE=i&id=someone@somewhere [https://climexp.knmi.nl/data/iera5_t2m_gl_a.txt ; http://archive.is/TrjQx]
  462. https://climexp.knmi.nl/data/imerra_t2m_0-360E_-90-90N_n_a.txt (http://archive.is/Aakh1 ; starting at "NASA MERRA-2" at https://climexp.knmi.nl/select.cgi, for temperature at 2m)
  463. https://climexp.knmi.nl/data/icfsr_t2m_0-360E_-90-90N_n_a.txt (http://archive.is/wqS7e; starting at "NCEP CFSR" at https://climexp.knmi.nl/select.cgi, for temperature at 2m)
  464. https://ds.data.jma.go.jp/tcc/tcc/products/gwp/temp/list/mon_wld.html [http://archive.is/Aaist]
  465. "Evolution of 21st century sea level rise projections"
  466. "Large-scale carbon sequestration in post-agrogenic ecosystems in Russia and Kazakhstan"
  467. "Carbon implications of forest restitution in post-socialist Romania"
  468. "Carbon cost of collective farming collapse in Russia"
  469. "Post-Soviet cropland abandonment and carbon sequestration in European Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus"
  470. "Large greenhouse gas savings due to changes in the post-Soviet food systems"
  471. "Atmospheric methane levels off: Temporary pause or a new steady‐state?"
  472. "Decreasing anthropogenic methane emissions in Europe and Siberia inferred from continuous carbon dioxide and methane observations at Alert, Canada"
  473. "NCEP–DOE AMIP-II Reanalysis (R-2)"
  474. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/data/gridded/data.ncep.reanalysis2.html
  475. "Global warming in an independent record of the past 130 years"
  476. "Last Millennium Reanalysis with an expanded proxy database and seasonal proxy modeling" [data addition: "Additions to the Last Millennium Reanalysis Multi-Proxy Database"]
  477. "The last millennium climate reanalysis project: Framework and first results"
  478. "Early onset of industrial-era warming across the oceans and continents" ["Corrigendum: Early onset of industrial-era warming across the oceans and continents"]
  479. "A global multiproxy database for temperature reconstructions of the Common Era"
  480. "Reconstructing paleoclimate fields using online data assimilation with a linear inverse model"
  481. "Global and hemispheric temperature reconstruction from glacier length fluctuations"
  482. "Independent confirmation of global land warming without the use of station temperatures"
  483. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/cgi-bin/data/testdap/timeseries.proc.pl?dataset1=ERA-20C&dataset2=20th+Century+Reanalysis+V2&var=2m+Air+Temperature&level=1000mb&pgT1Sel=10&pgtTitle1=&pgtPath1=&var2=2m+Air+Temperature&level2=1000mb&pgT2Sel=10&pgtTitle2=&pgtPath2=&fyear=1890&fyear2=2015&season=1&fmonth=0&fmonth2=11&type=1&climo1yr1=1981&climo1yr2=2010&climo2yr1=1981&climo2yr2=2010&xlat1=-90&xlat2=90&xlon1=0&xlon2=360&maskx=0&zlat1=-90&zlat2=90&zlon1=0&zlon2=360&maskx2=0&map=on&yaxis=0&bar=0&smooth=0&runmean=1&yrange1=0&yrange2=0&y2range1=0&y2range2=0&xrange1=0&xrange2=0&markers=0&legend=0&ywave1=&ywave2=&cwavelow=&cwavehigh=&cwaveint=&coi=0&Submit=Create+Plot [http://archive.is/pRFIJ]
  484. "ERA-20C: An atmospheric reanalysis of the twentieth century"
  485. "It’s not my consensus: Motivated reasoning and the sources of scientific illiteracy"
  486. "A blind expert test of contrarian claims about climate data"
  487. "Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government"
  488. "Motivated rejection of science" [DOI: 10.1177/0963721416654436]
  489. "Why people “don't trust the evidence” motivated reasoning and scientific beliefs"
  490. "Science denial across the political divide: Liberals and conservatives are similarly motivated to deny attitude-inconsistent science"
  491. "Overcoming endpoint bias in climate change communication: The case of Arctic sea ice trends"
  492. "Leveraging scientific credibility about Arctic sea ice trends in a polarized political environment"
  493. dessler2's (Andrew Dessler's) 2015 video: "The physics of climate change"
  494. "The impact of elite frames and motivated reasoning on beliefs in a global warming conspiracy: The promise and limits of trust"
  495. "Special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate"
  496. http://www.stallinga.org/Climate/IPCCpredictions.html [http://archive.is/oD9ah]
  497. https://stevengoddard.wordpress.com/2013/02/20/was-sandy-hook-a-test-case/ [http://archive.is/FYMoQ]
  498. https://stevengoddard.wordpress.com/2013/01/28/san-diego-police-chief-takes-credit-for-sandy-hook-massacre/ [http://archive.is/vAJEC]
  499. https://stevengoddard.wordpress.com/2013/03/29/so-who-was-adam-lanza-working-for/ [http://archive.is/ihFwB]
  500. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2014/06/25/on-denying-hockey-sticks-ushcn-data-and-all-that-part-1/#comment-1669249 [http://archive.is/ygGUh#selection-1825.951-1825.1259 ; "Goddard’s regular conspiracy theory about CIA drug use to brainwash school kids into shooting incidents in order to disarm conservatives in preparation for concentration camps for conservatives is something skeptics should stop ignoring and start actively shunning. His blog is the crack house of skepticism."]
  501. https://stevengoddard.wordpress.com/the-holocaust-began-with-gun-control-after-a-shooting/ [http://archive.is/RGcSt]
  502. https://realclimatescience.com/2017/11/what-conspiracy-theory-doesnt-look-like/ [http://archive.is/qmhjo]
  503. https://realclimatescience.com/2017/11/smoking-gun-of-incompetence-at-the-warren-commission/ [http://archive.is/wIGpA]
  504. https://stevengoddard.wordpress.com/2012/10/04/obama-runs-into-problems-without-his-teleprompter/ [http://archive.is/QWRc9]
  505. https://stevengoddard.wordpress.com/2013/10/25/only-missed-by-a-factor-of-five/ [http://archive.is/b6ryR]
  506. https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/mit-presidents-letter-repeats-standard-climate-alarm-claims-here-are-the-facts [http://archive.is/KuvsE#selection-1031.0-1043.79]
  507. http://funwithgovernment.blogspot.com/2011/06/climate-stupidity-13-ipcc-1990.html [http://archive.is/Tg0qb#selection-483.1-505.113]
  508. http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.com/2014/03/have-past-ipcc-temperature.html#c8683428075021666382 [http://archive.is/Oy36Y#selection-1677.0-1677.264]
  509. https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/first/m/moore-climate.html [http://archive.is/9Xybt#selection-161.502-161.853]
  510. "Measuring global ocean heat content to estimate the earth energy imbalance"
  511. https://notrickszone.com/2018/07/18/global-temperature-rise-some-75-lower-than-models-projected/#comment-1268568 [http://archive.is/8L82L#selection-935.0-1051.125]
  512. https://notrickszone.com/2018/07/18/global-temperature-rise-some-75-lower-than-models-projected/#comment-1268580 [http://archive.is/WZ8QM#selection-1171.0-1219.261]
  513. https://askepticalhuman.com/science/2019/3/16/debunking-climate-change-model-predictions-are-unreliable [https://web.archive.org/web/20191026145249/https://askepticalhuman.com/science/2019/3/16/debunking-climate-change-model-predictions-are-unreliable]
  514. Karl Popper's "Science: Conjectures and refutations"
  515. "Popper, Meehl, and progress: The evolving concept of risky test in the science of psychopathology"
  516. "Risky tests, verisimilitude, and path analysis"
  517. http://www.jsu.edu/depart/psychology/sebac/fac-sch/rm/Ch1-2.html [http://archive.is/89tqH]
  518. "Climate models: How to assess their reliability"
  519. https://judithcurry.com/2016/01/28/insights-from-karl-popper-how-to-open-the-deadlocked-climate-debate/ [http://archive.is/QxOuW]
  520. "Why Popper can’t resolve the debate over global warming: Problems with the uses of philosophy of science in the media and public framing of the science of global warming"
  521. 2012 version: "The role of “complex” empiricism in the debates about satellite data and climate models" [2018 version: https://sci-hub.tw/https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-65058-6_6]
  522. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/03/06/briggs-on-berkeleys-best-plus-my-thoughts-from-my-visit-there/ [http://archive.is/B6crm#selection-605.0-617.154]
  523. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/science/earth/21climate.html (http://archive.is/3EUG ; "Climate skeptics stay unswayed")
  524. https://www.skepticalscience.com/WattsandBEST.html [http://archive.is/F8qx2]
  525. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/10/21/best-what-i-agree-with-and-what-i-disagree-with-plus-a-call-for-additional-transparency-to-preven-pal-review/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20191026165054/https://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/10/21/best-what-i-agree-with-and-what-i-disagree-with-plus-a-call-for-additional-transparency-to-preven-pal-review/]
  526. https://www.forbes.com/sites/petergleick/2012/01/05/the-2011-climate-b-s-of-the-year-awards/#6c32e4f85ee5 ("The 2011 climate B.S.* of the year awards")
  527. https://grist.org/article/2011-03-30-wattsupwiththat-attack-on-berkeley-temperature-findings-was/ [http://archive.is/7S2c5]
  528. "Earth atmospheric land surface temperature and station quality in the contiguous United States"
  529. "Decadal variations in the global atmospheric land temperatures"
  530. "Influence of urban heating on the global temperature land average using rural sites identified from MODIS classifications"
  531. Youtube, greenmanbucket's video: "Richard Muller: I Was wrong on Climate Change"
  532. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html [http://archive.is/xK1wh ; "The conversion of a climate-change skeptic"]
  533. http://berkeleyearth.org/funders/ [http://archive.is/Is8sN]
  534. https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2012-jul-30-la-ol-muller-climate-20120730-story.html [http://archive.is/JvNtu]
  535. https://thinkprogress.org/bombshell-koch-funded-study-finds-global-warming-is-real-on-the-high-end-and-essentially-all-due-to-be07aeadc3de/ [https://web.archive.org/save/https://thinkprogress.org/bombshell-koch-funded-study-finds-global-warming-is-real-on-the-high-end-and-essentially-all-due-to-be07aeadc3de/]
  536. "The Modern-Era Retrospective Analysis for Research and Applications, Version 2 (MERRA-2)"
  537. "Technical report series on global modeling and data assimilation, volume 43"
  538. https://reanalyses.org/atmosphere/merra-2-notes-questions-and-discussion [http://archive.is/e8SU6#selection-1911.0-1955.27]
  539. From Kevin Cowtan: https://skepticalscience.com/jma_temperature_record.html [http://archive.is/GmNxF]  
  540. "Recent United Kingdom and global temperature variations"
  541. "Role of polar amplification in long-term surface air temperature variations and modern Arctic warming"
  542. "Amplified Arctic warming and mid-latitude weather: new perspectives on emerging connections"
  543. "Processes and impacts of Arctic amplification: A research synthesis"
  544. https://twitter.com/PhilosophySeel/status/1108410987739312128 [http://archive.is/PRzVJ#selection-225.0-437.7]
  545. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2016/09/24/old-tactics-revived-as-anthropogenic-global-warming-agw-deception-fails-an-open-letter-to-an-open-letter/ [http://archive.is/OqfjL#selection-803.0-803.116]
  546. https://twitter.com/RossMcKitrick/status/1076517620675997699 [http://archive.is/rOPJA#selection-225.0-317.7]
  547. https://twitter.com/RupertDarwall/status/1076523232533069824 [http://archive.is/Oka6R#selection-98.1-165.27]
  548. https://twitter.com/WeiZhangAtmos/status/1102772694234222593 [http://archive.is/GRiLh#selection-1306.1-1651.266]
  549. "The signal and the noise" [https://twitter.com/Senator_Assange/status/321775743237513217http://archive.is/GWfCI]
  550. http://joannenova.com.au/2012/12/the-ipcc-was-not-right-frame-stone-ignore-main-ipcc-predictions/ [http://archive.is/MK52m]
  551. http://joannenova.com.au/2012/12/the-ipcc-was-wrong-england-and-the-abc-mislead-australians/ [http://archive.is/NNK23]
  552. http://joannenova.com.au/2013/10/want-a-real-bet-on-the-climate-the-story-of-the-largest-private-wager-on-the-climate/ [http://archive.is/R8AjB#selection-3185.0-3199.134]
  553. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/18/chilling-climate-change-news/ [http://archive.is/rvuMZ#selection-2835.0-2841.541]
  554. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1074861836086992896 [http://archive.is/gKQDK]
  555. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1070779789966000128 [http://archive.is/51vss]
  556. "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programs"
  557. https://www.weather.gov/media/notification/tins/tin10-55cfs_aad.pdf [http://archive.is/FfNDv]
  558. Stefan Emeis': "Wind energy meteorology: Atmospheric Physics for wind power generation, second edition" [https://web.archive.org/web/20191109024549/https://books.google.com/books?id=6r1TDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA204&lpg=PA204&dq=CFSR+data+discontinuity&source=bl&ots=tK6wralVAU&sig=ACfU3U0qfS0la6ZYh6I9E_KY70IkYOkvvg&hl=en&ppis=_c&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwin_JWjjNzlAhUvjK0KHdyVBPMQ6AEwB3oECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=CFSR%20data%20discontinuity&f=false]
  559. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/cgi-bin/data/testdap/timeseries.proc.pl?dataset1=NCEP%2FCFSR&dataset2=ERA-5&var=2m+Air+Temperature&level=1000mb&pgT1Sel=10&pgtTitle1=&pgtPath1=&var2=2m+Air+Temperature&level2=1000mb&pgT2Sel=10&pgtTitle2=&pgtPath2=&fyear=1990&fyear2=2009&season=0&fmonth=0&fmonth2=11&type=1&climo1yr1=1990&climo1yr2=2019&climo2yr1=1990&climo2yr2=2019&xlat1=-90&xlat2=90&xlon1=0&xlon2=360&maskx=0&zlat1=-90&zlat2=90&zlon1=0&zlon2=360&maskx2=0&map=on&yaxis=0&bar=0&smooth=0&runmean=1&yrange1=0&yrange2=0&y2range1=0&y2range2=0&xrange1=0&xrange2=0&markers=0&legend=0&ywave1=&ywave2=&cwavelow=&cwavehigh=&cwaveint=&coi=0&Submit=Create+Plot [http://archive.is/LN9ea]
  560. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/cgi-bin/data/testdap/timeseries.proc.pl?dataset1=NCEP%2FCFSR&dataset2=ERA-5&var=2m+Air+Temperature&level=1000mb&pgT1Sel=10&pgtTitle1=&pgtPath1=&var2=2m+Air+Temperature&level2=1000mb&pgT2Sel=10&pgtTitle2=&pgtPath2=&fyear=2010&fyear2=2019&season=0&fmonth=0&fmonth2=11&type=1&climo1yr1=2010&climo1yr2=2019&climo2yr1=2010&climo2yr2=2019&xlat1=-90&xlat2=90&xlon1=0&xlon2=360&maskx=0&zlat1=-90&zlat2=90&zlon1=0&zlon2=360&maskx2=0&map=on&yaxis=0&bar=0&smooth=0&runmean=1&yrange1=0&yrange2=0&y2range1=0&y2range2=0&xrange1=0&xrange2=0&markers=0&legend=0&ywave1=&ywave2=&cwavelow=&cwavehigh=&cwaveint=&coi=0&Submit=Create+Plot [http://archive.is/0H8se]
  561. "A study of wind speed variability using global reanalysis data" [https://web.archive.org/web/20191109180339/https://aws-dewi.ul.com/assets/A-Study-of-Wind-Speed-Variability-Using-Global-Reanalysis-Data2.pdf]
  562. "Climate change 2007: The physical science basis; Summary for policymakers"
  563. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2017/10/30/some-failed-climate-predictions/#comment-2194142 [https://web.archive.org/web/20191110010821/https://wattsupwiththat.com/2017/10/30/some-failed-climate-predictions/ ; "On (1), I don’t believe it is Scen A [...]"]
  564. "Climatology versus pseudoscience: Exposing the failed predictions of global warming skeptics"
  565. http://solarnotbombs.org/models-vs-data/ [http://archive.is/Yn4NP]
  566. "Climate change: The IPCC response strategies" [https://web.archive.org/web/20191110053245/https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ipcc_far_wg_III_full_report.pdf]
  567. "Climate change 2013: Synthesis Report; Summary for policymakers"
  568. https://reason.com/2015/04/08/detection-of-enhanced-greenhouse-warming/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20191111010447/https://reason.com/2015/04/08/detection-of-enhanced-greenhouse-warming/]
  569. http://hockeyschtick.blogspot.com/2015/04/according-to-1990-ipcc-report-warming.html [http://archive.is/X3tQl]
  570. https://judithcurry.com/2018/06/28/nature-unbound-ix-21st-century-climate-change/ [http://archive.is/uOr03#selection-821.680-851.1919]
  571. "Econometric estimates of Earth’s transient climate sensitivity"
  572. "Emergent constraints on Earth's transient and equilibrium response to doubled CO2 from post-1970s global warming"
  573. https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2241/why-so-many-global-temperature-records/ [http://archive.is/eCRix]
  574. https://skepticalscience.com/lessons-from-past-climate-predictions-ipcc-far.html [http://archive.is/LcPSe]
  575. https://www.cato.org/blog/global-science-report-jra-55-better-best-global-surface-temperature-history-cooler-rest [http://archive.is/tFjEf ; https://wattsupwiththat.com/2017/11/23/besting-the-best-surface-temperature-record/ (http://archive.is/TyssL)]
  576. https://www.drroyspencer.com/2019/08/evidence-that-era5-based-global-temperatures-have-spurious-warming/#comment-373222 [http://archive.is/Dpbdb#selection-10581.0-10617.112https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EBbbplWWkAIPjEM?format=png&name=small; (http://archive.is/hWuQB) ; https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1195877969954246657 (http://archive.is/mzLGB)]
  577. "Using Late Pleistocene sea surface temperature reconstructions to constrain future greenhouse warming"
  578. https://climateaudit.org/2008/01/16/thoughts-on-hansen-et-al-1988/#comment-132772 [http://archive.is/gRokW#selection-5113.0-5117.236]
  579. "Revised estimates of paleoclimate sensitivity over the past 800,000 years"
  580. "The effect of obliquity‐driven changes on paleoclimate sensitivity during the Late Pleistocene"
  581. https://judithcurry.com/2019/11/12/legacy-of-climategate-10-years-later/#comment-902752 [http://archive.is/Dfeow#selection-3211.0-3235.366]
  582. "Science and public policy: The virtuous corruption of virtual environmental science"
  583. "International environmental policy: Interests and the failure of the Kyoto process"
  584. https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickmichaels/2012/12/18/the-uns-global-warming-forecasts-are-performing-very-very-badly/#7baca75648a8 [https://web.archive.org/web/20191007020057/https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickmichaels/2012/12/18/the-uns-global-warming-forecasts-are-performing-very-very-badly/]
  585. https://climateaudit.org/2013/09/30/ipcc-disappears-the-discrepancy/ [http://archive.is/ytcdS]
  586. https://www.foxnews.com/science/draft-un-climate-report-shows-20-years-of-overestimated-global-warming-skeptics-warn [https://web.archive.org/web/20181014211212/https://www.foxnews.com/science/draft-un-climate-report-shows-20-years-of-overestimated-global-warming-skeptics-warn]
  587. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/12/18/dr-david-whitehouse-on-the-ar5-figure-1-4/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20190926133043/https://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/12/18/dr-david-whitehouse-on-the-ar5-figure-1-4/]
  588. https://skepticalscience.com/news.php?p=2&t=192&&n=2218 [https://web.archive.org/web/20150920211501/https://www.skepticalscience.com/news.php?p=2&t=192&&n=2218]
  589. http://coyoteblog.com/coyote_blog/2016/04/denying-the-catastrophe-4a-actual-temperature-data-2.html [http://archive.is/xZOj6#selection-417.208-431.741]
  590. https://tamino.wordpress.com/2012/12/20/fake-skeptic-draws-fake-picture-of-global-temperature/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20190105172116/https://tamino.wordpress.com/2012/12/20/fake-skeptic-draws-fake-picture-of-global-temperature/]
  591. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1171055898933940226 [http://archive.is/ocbep#selection-230.1-1288.2]
  592. https://skepticalscience.com/patrick-michaels-history-getting-climate-wrong.html [http://archive.is/S2OHe]
  593. https://climateinvestigations.org/patrick-michaels-climate-denial/ [http://archive.is/NFgm2]
  594. https://twitter.com/BigJoeBastardi/status/79381272492912640 [http://archive.is/L9C1g#selection-98.1-173.44]
  595. https://twitter.com/BigJoeBastardi/status/290324208410574848 [http://archive.is/a21uh#selection-98.1-190.1]
  596. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1066223748037128192 [http://archive.is/FAVSK#selection-98.1-648.0]
  597. https://judithcurry.com/2019/01/03/reconstructing-a-dataset-of-observed-global-temperatures-1950-2016-from-human-and-natural-influences/#comment-887460 [http://archive.is/wlsz8#selection-2073.0-2073.159]
  598. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1073920451582353408 [http://archive.is/qwHnX#selection-230.1-341.7] (citing: https://web.archive.org/web/20191123025212/https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases-all?ID=865dbe39-802a-23ad-4949-ee9098538277)
  599. http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2019/06/unforced-variations-vs-forced-responses [http://archive.is/NGGih]
  600. https://twitter.com/BigJoeBastardi/status/894949837669638144 [http://archive.is/aJfMm#selection-98.1-199.7]
  601. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2016/06/21/global-temperatures-are-heading-downward-and-fast/ [http://archive.is/F9a1N#selection-621.0-626.1]
  602. https://wattsupwiththat.wordpress.com/2016/02/10/el-nino-collapse-appears-to-be-underway/ [http://archive.is/qlptF#selection-507.0-529.32]
  603. "Reconciling climate model/data discrepancies: The case of the 'trees that didn't bark'"
  604. https://blogs.egu.eu/divisions/gd/2017/09/13/modern-day-sea-level-rise/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20191125143439/https://blogs.egu.eu/divisions/gd/2017/09/13/modern-day-sea-level-rise/]
  605. "Equilibrium climate sensitivity estimated by equilibrating climate models"
  606. https://twitter.com/mattwridley/status/1121297704682950656 [http://archive.is/iHa4a#selection-330.1-421.22]
  607. https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1074904479168909313[https://web.archive.org/web/20191125190204/https://twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/web/20191125190204/https:/twitter.com/AtomsksSanakan/status/1074904479168909313]
  608. https://skepticalscience.com/lessons-ridley-ipcc-hansen.html [http://archive.is/ktL1c]
  609. https://scienceblogs.com/deltoid/2013/01/13/the-australians-war-on-science-81-matt-ridleys-20-year-old-wrong-prediction [http://archive.is/EjfCt]
  610. https://scienceblogs.com/deltoid/2013/01/14/matt-ridley-responds-with-a-sleight-of-hand [http://archive.is/FlUDa]
  611. https://twitter.com/mattwridley/status/413715964803301376 [http://archive.is/Kyjix#selection-98.1-181.21]
  612. https://twitter.com/GalileoMovement/status/278686978294292481 [http://archive.is/a4Mho]
  613. https://twitter.com/lemire/status/383254422459260928 [http://archive.is/yCMFm#selection-1298.1-1383.21]
  614. https://www.climatedepot.com/2013/10/25/un-ipcc-1990-sea-level-predictions-only-missed-by-a-factor-of-five-the-1990-ipcc-report-predicted-about-120-mm-of-sea-level-rise-by-the-year-2014/ [http://archive.is/o57aV]
  615. "A multicointegration model of global climate change"
  616. http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2019/12/how-good-have-climate-models-been-at-truly-predicting-the-future [http://archive.is/gKRc3]
  617. https://twitter.com/hausfath/status/1202271427807678464 [http://archive.is/CdxzD]
  618. "Health consequences of smoking 1–4 cigarettes per day"
  619. "Health effects of light and intermittent smoking: A review"
  620. "Association of long-term, low-intensity smoking with all-cause and cause-specific mortality in the National Institutes of Health–AARP Diet and Health Study"
  621. "Non-daily cigarette smokers: mortality risks in the US"
  622. "A new compilation of globally gridded night‐time marine air temperatures: The UAHNMATv1 dataset"
  623. "The response of the ocean thermal skin layer to variations in incident infrared radiation" [further discussion in: http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2006/09/why-greenhouse-gases-heat-the-ocean/ (http://archive.is/A4evB ; "Why greenhouse gases heat the ocean")]
  624. https://www.abc.net.au/qanda/qa-climate-debate/10661338 (http://archive.is/zDQJC ; "[Nick Minchin:] So there is a major problem with the warmist argument because we have had rising CO2 but we haven't had the commensurate rise in temperature that the IPCC predicted. [...] [Matthew England:] What Nick just said is actually not true. The IPCC projections of 1990 have borne out very accurately the projections now 22 years old and the temperature record that we have does bounce around from year to year but that decade by decade progression of warming that Megan just mentioned has occurred.")
  625. http://joannenova.com.au/2012/04/abc-biased-scientist-matthew-england-outrageous-error-or-dishonest-nick-minchin-owed-an-apology/ [http://archive.is/BqrGE]
  626. https://sciencespeak.com/climate-abc.html [http://archive.is/wW4zw]
  627. From Kevin Cowtan: https://skepticalscience.com/hadsst4_sea_surface_temperature.html [http://archive.is/u0g9q]
  628. "Estimating sea surface temperature measurement methods using characteristic differences in the diurnal cycle"
  629. "100 years of progress in understanding the stratosphere and mesosphere"
  630. https://notrickszone.com/2015/07/19/global-cooling-current-2011-2020-decade-running-colder-than-previous-2001-2010-decade/ [http://archive.is/C5qsq#selection-233.0-257.146]
  631. "Robust comparison of climate models with observations using blended land air and ocean sea surface temperatures"
  632. https://wattsupwiththat.com/2017/11/23/besting-the-best-surface-temperature-record/#comment-2217607 [http://archive.is/dSA9m#selection-11767.0-11805.525]
  633. "Sensitivity of attribution of anthropogenic near-surface warming to observational uncertainty"
  634. "Uncertainty estimates for sea surface temperature and land surface air temperature in NOAAGlobalTemp version 5"
  635. https://www.drroyspencer.com/2019/08/evidence-that-era5-based-global-temperatures-have-spurious-warming/ [http://archive.is/qMZtM]
  636. https://tamino.wordpress.com/2020/01/05/trend-pat-michaels-and-ryan-maue-ride-the-crazy-train/ [http://archive.is/p4CcF]
  637. https://twitter.com/RyanMaue/status/1212056049550856192 [http://archive.is/KFdji#selection-2853.0-3834.2]
  638. "Internet blogs, polar bears, and climate-change denial by proxy"
  639. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/432482/ocr_the_global_warming_policy_foundation.pdf ("Operational Case Report: The Global Warming Policy Foundation (1131448)")
  640. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/75857/1/blogs.lse.ac.uk-Is%20the%20Global%20Warming%20Policy%20Foundation%20complying%20with%20Charity%20Commission%20rules.pdf ("Is the Global Warming Policy Foundation complying with Charity Commission rules?")
  641. "Cross-national comparison of the presence of climate scepticism in the print media in six countries, 2007–10"
  642. "Resisting meaningful action of climate change: Think tanks, 'merchants of doubt' and the 'corporate capture' of sustainable development"
  643. "Renewables: A review of sustainable energy supply options" (Chapter 7, by David Elliott)
  644. "Think tanks, television news and impartiality: The ideological balance of sources in BBC programming"
  645. Conference presentation:  "The influence of prescribed boundary conditions on near-surface temperature over the Arctic in the MERRA-2 atmospheric model"[https://web.archive.org/web/20200109010413/https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20180008512.pdf ; {abstract: https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180008512 (http://archive.is/Qo0h4)}]
  646. Conference presentation: "An intercomparison of changes associated with Earth's lower tropospheric temperature using traditional and AMIP-style reanalyses" [https://web.archive.org/web/20200109011735/https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170011216.pdf {abstract: https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170011216 (http://archive.is/Bawwy)}]
  647. "An emergent constraint on Transient Climate Response from simulated historical warming in CMIP6 models"
  648. http://icecap.us/index.php/go/political-climate/should_you_trust_noaa_claims_about_may_and_june_records2/ [http://archive.is/7tPRo#selection-264.1-264.2]
  649. https://twitter.com/Diamondthedave [http://archive.is/z6Fvc#selection-183.0-844.0]
  650. https://www.eike-klima-energie.eu/2016/04/20/globales-meereis-starkes-comeback/ [http://archive.is/F3Uu0]
  651. https://us-issues.com/2017/07/09/2017-global-temperatures-are-leveling-off/ [http://archive.is/EQ0dA]
  652. http://tomnelson.blogspot.com/2013/01/bummer-from-australian-warmist-tim.html [http://archive.is/LpHl6]
  653. https://twitter.com/khaustein/status/749022819158204416 [http://archive.is/m5ZyH#selection-558.0-727.4]
  654. Youtube, The Heartland Institute's video: "Debunking Climate Alarmism During COP25 in Madrid - Heartland's James Taylor"
  655. http://rabett.blogspot.com/2020/01/ive-won-my-climate-bet-for-1500-what-do.html [http://archive.is/JIRjv]
  656. http://joannenova.com.au/2014/01/i-already-have-a-climate-bet-with-a-brian-schmidt-id-like-to-do-another/ [http://archive.is/onr6L]
  657. "Substantial twentieth-century Arctic warming caused by ozone-depleting substances"
  658. "Greenhouse effects due to man-made perturbations of trace gases"
  659. "Greenhouse effect of chlorofluorocarbons and other trace gases"
  660. "Greenhouse effect due to chlorofluorocarbons: Climatic implications"
  661. "Trace gas trends and their potential role in climate change"
  662. "The CFC greenhouse potential of scenarios possible under the Montreal Protocol"
  663. "Future global warming from atmospheric trace gases"
  664. "Model calculations of the relative effects of CFCs and their replacements on global warming"
  665. "Drivers of CO2 emissions in the former Soviet Union: A country level IPAT analysis from 1990 to 2010"
  666. "Driving forces of CO2 emissions in the G20 countries: An index decomposition analysis from 1971 to 2010"
  667. "Drivers of greenhouse gas emissions in the Baltic States: A structural decomposition analysis"
  668. "Global and regional fluxes of carbon from land use and land cover change 1850–2015"
  669. "The robust relationship between conspiracism and denial of (climate) science"
  670. http://berkeleyearth.org/2019-temperatures/ [http://archive.is/vM0j2#selection-1461.0-1483.273]
  671. "WMO Greenhouse Gas Bulletin (GHG Bulletin) - No. 15: The state of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere based on global observations through 2018" [https://web.archive.org/web/20200128165229/https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=10100]
  672. "Surface temperature of the planet Earth from satellite data"
  673. "A new merge of global surface temperature datasets since the start of the 20th century"
  674. http://climexp.knmi.nl/select.cgi?id=someone@somewhere&field=cmst [http://climexp.knmi.nl/data/icmst_0-360E_-90-90N_n_0p_19782018a.txt (http://archive.is/JLfOp)]
  675. "Towards a more reliable historical reanalysis: Improvements for version 3 of the Twentieth Century Reanalysis system"
  676. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/cgi-bin/data/testdap/timeseries.proc.pl?dataset1=ERA-20C&dataset2=20th+Century+Reanalysis+V3&var=2m+Air+Temperature&level=1000mb&pgT1Sel=10&pgtTitle1=&pgtPath1=&var2=2m+Air+Temperature&level2=1000mb&pgT2Sel=10&pgtTitle2=&pgtPath2=&fyear=1990&fyear2=2019&season=1&fmonth=0&fmonth2=11&type=1&climo1yr1=1990&climo1yr2=2019&climo2yr1=1990&climo2yr2=2019&xlat1=-90&xlat2=90&xlon1=0&xlon2=360&maskx=0&zlat1=-90&zlat2=90&zlon1=0&zlon2=360&maskx2=0&map=on&yaxis=0&bar=0&smooth=0&runmean=1&yrange1=0&yrange2=0&y2range1=0&y2range2=0&xrange1=0&xrange2=0&markers=0&legend=0&ywave1=&ywave2=&cwavelow=&cwavehigh=&cwaveint=&coi=0&Submit=Create+Plot [http://archive.is/jC1xN]
  677. "Econometric modelling of climate systems: The equivalence of energy balance models and cointegrated vector autoregressions"
  678. "How accurately can the climate sensitivity to CO2 be estimated from historical climate change?"
  679. "Potential problems measuring climate sensitivity from the historical record"
  680. "Quasi-experimental estimates of the transient climate response using observational data"
  681. "Climate sensitivity from both physical and carbon cycle feedbacks"
  682. http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/paris-climate-conference/ [http://archive.is/B0ItJ]
  683. https://www.wsj.com/articles/matt-ridleyclimate-forecast-muting-the-alarm-1395962617
  684. https://skepticalscience.com/print.php?n=1828 [http://archive.is/pQGN6]
  685. "Climate change 2007: Synthesis Report"
  686. http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2019/12/how-good-have-climate-models-been-at-truly-predicting-the-future/#comment-751657 [http://archive.is/XdXrB#selection-891.1-947.237]
  687. http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2019/12/how-good-have-climate-models-been-at-truly-predicting-the-future/#comment-751612 [http://archive.is/UQZIj#selection-581.0-625.81]
  688. http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2019/12/how-good-have-climate-models-been-at-truly-predicting-the-future/#comment-751704 [http://archive.is/r4AUq#selection-1247.2-1303.136]
  689. https://judithcurry.com/2020/01/17/explaining-the-discrepancies-between-hausfather-et-al-2019-and-lewiscurry-2018/ [http://archive.is/Isr1a]
  690. https://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2013/03/Whitehouse-GT_Standstill.pdf ["The global warming standstill"; https://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2013/03/Whitehouse-GT_Standstill.pdf]
  691. "Energy budget constraints on historical radiative forcing"
  692. http://www.drroyspencer.com/2019/04/uah-rss-noaa-uw-which-satellite-dataset-should-we-believe/ [http://archive.is/xxkP9#selection-247.117-269.180]
  693. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/global/time-series

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